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Abstract
In subsistence economies with general convex technology and ratio-
nal optimising agents, a new, axiomatic approach is developed, which
allows an explicit analysis of the core positive and normative intuitions
behind the concept of exploitation. Three main new axioms, called
Labour Exploitation in Subsistence Economies, Relational
Exploitation,a n dFeasibility of Non-Exploitation, are presented
and it is proved that they uniquely characterise a deﬁnition of ex-
ploitation conceptually related to the so-called “New-Interpretation”
(Duménil, 1980; Foley, 1982; Duménil at el., 2009), which focuses on
the unequal distribution of (and control over) social labour, and on
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1individual well-being freedom and the self-realisation of men. Then,
the main results of Roemer’s (1982, 1988) classical approach and all
the crucial insights of exploitation theory are generalised, proving that
every agent’s class and exploitation status emerges in the competitive
equilibrium, that there is a correspondence between an agent’s class
and exploitation status, and that the existence of exploitation is in-
herently linked to the existence of positive proﬁts.
JEL: D63 (Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Cri-
teria and Measurement); D51 (General Equilibrium: Exchange and
Production Economies); C62 (Existence and Stability Conditions of
E q u i l i b r i u m ) ;B 5 1( S o c i a l i s t ;M a r x i s t ,S r a ﬃan).
Keywords: Justice, Exploitation, Class, Convex Economies.
21 Introduction
The notion of exploitation is prominent in the social sciences and in political
discourse. It is central in a number of debates, ranging from analyses of
labour relations, especially focusing on the weakest segments of the labour
force, such as children, women, and migrants (see, e.g., ILO, 2005; 2005a;
2006); to controversies on drug-testing and on the price of life-saving drugs,
especially in developing countries;1 to ethical issues arising in surrogate moth-
erhood (see, e.g., Field, 1989; Wood, 1995). The concept of exploitation is
also central in the politics of the Left. In the 2007 programme of the German
Social Democratic Party, for example, the very ﬁrst paragraph advocates a
society ‘free from poverty, exploitation, and fear’ (SPD, 2007, p.3), and the
ﬁght against exploitation is repeatedly indicated as a priority for the biggest
party of the European Left. The notion of exploitation is arguably the cor-
nerstone of Marxist social theory, but it is also extensively discussed in nor-
mative theory and political philosophy (see, e.g., Wertheimer, 1996; Wolﬀ,
1999; Bigwood, 2003; and Sample, 2003).2 Yet, there is little agreement con-
cerning even the most basic features of exploitative relations, and both the
deﬁnition of exploitation and its normative content are highly controversial.3
In general, agent A exploits agent B if and only if A takes unfair ad-
vantage of B. Despite its intuitive appeal, this deﬁnition leaves two major
issues in need of precise speciﬁcation from a normative perspective, namely
the source of the unfairness and the structure of the relationship between A
and B that allows A to take advantage of B. There is considerable debate
1In a section devoted to ‘Ethical Issues,’ the Investigation Committee on the clini-
cal trial of the drug ‘Trovan’ conducted by Pﬁzer in 1996 in Kano (Nigeria) argue that
‘Compensations to the participants were minimal or non existent, as such a clear case of
exploitation of the ignorant was established’ (Federal Ministry of Health of Nigeria, 2001,
p.88).
2The notion of exploitation is relevant, for example, in Lockean or Neo-Lockean political
philosophy, whereby exploitation occurs if the principle of Just Acquisition of unowned
land is violated by State intervention; or in Neoclassical economic philosophy, whereby
exploitation occurs in non-competitive markets if the distributive principle of marginal
productivity is violated.
3For a review of some of the debates in exploitation theory, see Nielsen and Ware
(1997).
3in the economic and philosophical literature concerning both issues. At one
extreme, in his seminal theory of exploitation, John Roemer (1982, 1988)
argues that exploitation is a purely distributive concept which makes no ref-
erence to the interaction between agents and identiﬁes an injustice stemming
from an unequal distribution of assets. At the other extreme, contra Roemer,
various authors deny that exploitation involves a distributive injustice and
claim that the moral force of exploitation derives entirely from the objec-
tionable features of the interaction between agents (e.g., Wolﬀ, 1999; Wood,
2004).
As shown by Veneziani (2008), and as acknowledged by Roemer himself in
later contributions, Roemer’s claim that exploitation is a purely distributive
concept is not convincing.4 Some notion of unequal power, or dominance, is
arguably crucial in any theory of exploitation and the positive and normative
analysis of exploitative relations involves some consideration of the way in
which A and B interact.5 It seems, however, equally reductive to assume that
inequalities deriving from exploitative relations between agents are immate-
rial in the judgment of exploitation. As forcefully argued by Warren (1997,
p.63), “exploitation involves inequality on both ends of exchange: inequality
deﬁning the context of the exchange (that is, [diﬀerential ownership of pro-
ductive assets]) and inequality deﬁning the outcome.”6 So, although power,
force, or dominance, are arguably crucial elements of exploitation theory, the
analytical focus on this paper is on the source of the unfairness of exploitative
relations, and on the injustice involved in the concept of exploitation within
economic relations.
More speciﬁcally, this paper analyses the theory of exploitation as an
unequal exchange (hereafter, UE) of labour, according to which exploitative
relations are characterised by a diﬀerence between the hours of labour that an
individual provides and the hours of labour necessary to produce commodi-
ties that she can purchase with her income. There are at least two reasons
4For a thorough analysis of Roemer’s distributive approach, see Skillman (1995). Skill-
man (1995) argues that Roemer’s approach is consistent with Marx’s own account.
5In fact, Yoshihara (1998) showed that exploitative status is linked with the degree of
labour-discipline, which reﬂects power relations in capitalist economies.
6In this perspective, “it is not unequal power itself that is supposed objectionable, but
rather the fact that one person gains unjustly through the exercise of power (whether coer-
cive or uncoercive) over another” (Warren, 1997, p.62). According to Warren, the relevant
outcome inequality concerns indeed the unequal performance of labor, as suggested also
in this paper.
4to focus on labour as the measure of the injustice of exploitative relations.
First, in a number of crucial economic interactions, the notion of exploita-
tion seems inextricably linked with some form of labour exchange.7 Second,
the UE deﬁnition of exploitation captures some inequalities in the distrib-
ution of material well-being and free hours that are - at least prima facie
- of normative relevance. As shown in this paper, for example, it is possi-
ble to signiﬁcantly generalise the so-called Class-Exploitation Correspondence
Principle (hereafter, CECP; see Roemer, 1982, 1988), according to which in
a private-ownership economy with positive proﬁts, class and UE exploitation
status are strictly related, and they accurately reﬂect an unequal distribution
of assets. That is, in equilibrium, the wealthiest agents emerge as exploiters,
and members of the capitalist class, whereas poor agents are exploited, and
members of the working class. As in standard Marxist theory, then, exploita-
tive relations are relevant in that they reﬂect unequal opportunities of life
options, due to unequal access to productive assets.
Interestingly, however, the UE concept of exploitation can also be seen
as capturing inequalities in the distribution of well-being freedom.I n f a c t ,
as argued by Rawls (1971) and Sen (1985a, 1985b), among the others, an
individual’s well-being freedom captures her ability to pursue the life she
values.89There are two crucial factors that determine the degree of indi-
vidual’s well-being freedom, or self-realisation: one is the amount of income
she can spend to purchase the commodities necessary to achieve her goals,
and the other is the amount of time she has to sacriﬁce as labour supply in
order to purchase such commodities.10 Then, the rate of labour exploitation
can represent the degree of well-being freedom, or indeed unfreedom, of the
7Despite his initial criticism of the UE deﬁnition, Roemer has later acknowledged that
the exchange of labour is essential in explotiative relations, and “the expenditure of eﬀort
is characteristically associated with exploitation” (Roemer, 1989b, fn.11). See also Roemer
(1989a, pp. 258-260; 1989b, p. 96).
8Interestingly, this notion of freedom is conceptually related to the Marxian notion of
self-realisation, and one can argue that both commodit i e sa n df r e et i m ea r ee s s e n t i a lf o r
an individual’s self-realisation.
9In the Rawls-Sen theory, inequalities in the distribution of well-being freedom are
formulated as inequalities of capabilities. The resource allocation problem, in terms of
equality of capability, is explicitly analysed in Gotoh and Yoshihara (2003).
10In this view, labour only yields disutility and it reduces the possibility to self-realise.
To assume away completely the possibility that work itself may be a source of well-being
freedom may be unrealistic, but it is appropriate at the level of analysis of this paper, and
it is consistent with a Marxian analysis of capitalist relations of production.
5agent, since it can be taken as an index of the relative attainment of these
two goods by using labour time as the numéraire: if an agent gains from the
unequal exchange of labour, then she is exploiting t h ef r e eh o u r sw h i c hs o m e
other agents sacriﬁced as labour supply for the production of the commodi-
ties she can purchase, whereas if she suﬀers from the unequal exchange of
labour, she is exploited in the sense that some of the free hours she sacriﬁced
as labour supply to purchase the commodities are appropriated by somebody
else.
Granting the normative relevance of the unequal exchange of labour, there
are many possible ways of rigorously specifying the concept of UE exploita-
tion and a number of alternative deﬁnitions have indeed been proposed in
the literature (for a thorough discussion, see Yoshihara, 2007). This pa-
per provides the ﬁrst rigorous axiomatic analysis of UE exploitation: this
is a completely new approach to exploitation theory and it provides a fully
general framework to compare the most important deﬁnitions of exploita-
tion discussed in the literature. An axiomatic approach was long overdue in
exploitation theory, where the proposal of alternative deﬁnitions have some-
times appeared as a painful process of adjustment of the theory to the var-
ious counterexamples and formal exceptions found in the literature. The
deﬁnitions of exploitation thus constructed have progressively lost the in-
tuitive appeal, the normative relevance, and even the connection with the
actual, observed variables emerging from a competitive mechanism. By tak-
ing an axiomatic approach, this paper suggests to start from ﬁrst principles,
thus explicitly discussing the normative intuitions behind exploitation theory.
Therefore, the approach proposed in this paper, and the analysis developed
below should be interesting for all exploitation theorists, and indeed for all
social scientists and political philosophers, even if the speciﬁca x i o m sp r o -
posed may be deemed unsatisfactory.
To be precise, this paper analyses exploitation theory in a class of con-
vex subsistence economies which generalise Roemer (1982, 1988). In this
class of economies, each producer can use a general convex technology and
is assumed to minimize her labour supply under the constraint that she has
to earn enough to purchase a subsistence vector. First of all, an axiom is
introduced, called Labour Exploitation in Subsistence Economies (hereafter,
LES), which restricts the way in which the sets of exploiters and exploited
agents should be identiﬁed in equilibrium. This axiom is taken as the minimal
necessary condition to stipulate the normative intuitions behind exploitation
theory, and it is shown that all the main deﬁnitions of exploitation proposed
6in the literature (see, for example, Morishima, 1974; Roemer, 1982; Yoshi-
hara, 2007) do satisfy LES. Then, Theorems 1 and 2 provide a signiﬁcant
generalisation of Roemer’s (1982, 1988) celebrated results: they derive the
equilibrium class and exploitation structures of a general convex cone sub-
sistence economy with optimising agents for a whole class of deﬁnitions of
exploitation satisfying LES. Further, Theorems 3 and 4 derive the neces-
sary and suﬃcient conditions under which, for a whole class of deﬁnitions
of exploitation satisfying LES, and for any convex subsistence economy, the
CECP holds and the existence of exploitation is synonymous with the exis-
tence of positive proﬁts, respectively. These results are theoretically relevant
because, as argued by Roemer (1982), although they are formally derived
as theorems, their epistemological status is as postulates: any deﬁnition of
exploitation should preserve them.
Then, three additional axioms are introduced: the ﬁrst states that any de-
ﬁnition of UE exploitation should guarantee the feasibility of non-exploitative
allocations: this is a desirable property if exploitation is not to be considered
an evil that agents should learn to live with. The second axiom requires
that the deﬁnition of the status of exploiter or exploited agent should be
independent of the distribution of productive endowments in the economy.
The third axiom captures the relational nature of exploitative relations by
ruling out the possibility that there exists exploiters without any agent being
exploited, and vice versa. Interestingly, although almost all the formulations
of UE exploitation discussed in the literature satisfy LES, the feasibility
of non-exploitation, and the independence axiom, Theorem 5 proves that
a generalised version of the so-called “New Interpretation” (Duménil, 1980;
Foley, 1982; Duménil at el., 2009) is the unique deﬁnition of exploitation
that satisﬁes all axioms. As a corollary, it follows that the generalised “New
Interpretation” is the unique formulation of UE exploitation that satisﬁes
the four axioms and under which the CECP holds in the class of general
convex cone subsistence economies.
There are two main reasons to focus on static subsistence economies.
First of all, the analysis of subsistence economies with a labour market is
theoretically crucial in that they provide the simplest institutional framework
in which exploitation arises. In particular, in order to analyse the distributive
issues related to exploitation, it is appropriate to abstract from the role that
exploitation plays in the accumulation process.11 The model of a subsistence
11It is also worth noting that the subsistence vector can also be interpreted as a social
7economy may not be a realistic representation of ‘actual economies,’ but it is
an abstract model suitable to illustrate some of the essential characteristics of
market economies with private ownership of productive assets. Besides, from
a theoretical viewpoint, one may argue that the distinctive characteristic of
capitalist economies is the existence of a labour market, in which labour is
exchanged as a commodity, rather than accumulation and growth. Second,
from a formal viewpoint, subsistence economies provide a particularly neat
framework for the analysis of exploitation, which allows one to derive stark
results. However, the main conclusions can be generalised to accumulation
economies (see Yoshihara, 2007) and to dynamic economies along the lines,
e.g., of Veneziani (2007, 2008) and Veneziani and Yoshihara (2009), albeit at
the cost of a substantial increase in unnecessary technicalities.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In section 2, the model of
a general convex subsistence economy is set up. In section 3, the notions of
exploitation and classes are deﬁned and axiom LES is presented. It is then
s h o w nt h a ta l lt h em o s ti m p o r t a n td e ﬁnitions of exploitation presented in
t h el i t e r a t u r es a t i s f yLES. The complete class and exploitation structures of
the economy for the class of deﬁnitions of exploitation satisfying LES are
derived. In section 4, the necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the CECP
to hold for a class of deﬁnitions of exploitation satisfying LES are derived. In
Section 5 the three additional axioms, called Feasibility of Non-Exploitation,
Independence of Endowment Structure, and Relational Exploitation are pre-
sented and the main characterisation result of the paper is derived. Section
6 concludes and the existence of a general equilibrium is proved in Appendix
1, whereas all the proofs of the formal results are in Appendix 2.
2 A Model of General Convex Subsistence
Economies
Let P be the production set. P h a se l e m e n t so ft h ef o r mα =( −α0,−α,α)
where α0 ∈ R+ , α ∈ Rm
+ ,a n dα ∈ Rm
+ . Thus, elements of P are vectors in
reference bundle of commodities, which represents a decent living standard, rather than as
a consumption bundle necessary for survival. In this case, once the decent living standard
is reached, each agent is free to determine how to use her spare time, if any. Then, the
existence of UE exploitation represents unequal allocations of free hours among agents,
given that everyone reaches the decent living standard, which straightforwardly implies
unequal opportunities for self-realisation and well-being freeedom.
8R2m+1.T h eﬁrst component, −α0, is the direct labour input of the process
α; the next m components, −α, are the inputs of goods used in the process;
and the last m components, α, are the outputs of the m goods from the
process. The net output vector arising from α is denoted as b α ≡ α−α.T h e
set P is assumed to be a closed convex cone containing the origin in R2m+1.
Moreover, let 0 ∈Rm be such that 0 =( 0 ,...,0)0: it is assumed that12
A1. ∀α ∈ P s.t. α0 ≥ 0 and α = 0, [α ≥ 0 ⇒ α0 > 0].
A2. ∀ c ∈ Rm
+ , ∃α ∈ P s.t. b α = c.
A3. ∀α ∈ P, ∀(−α0,α0) ∈ Rm
− ×Rm
+ , [(−α0,α0) 5 (−α,α) ⇒ (−α0,−α0,α0) ∈ P].
A1 implies that labour is indispensable to produce any non-negative output
vector; A2 states that any non-negative commodity vector is producible as a
net output; and A3 is a free disposal condition, which states that, given any
feasible production process α, any vector producing (weakly) less net output
than α is also feasible using the same amount of labour as α itself.
Given P, it is possible to deﬁne the set of net output vectors that can be
produced using exactly l units of labour, denoted as b P (α0 = l). Formally:
b P (α0 = l) ≡ {b α ∈ R
m | ∃α =( −l,−α,α) ∈ P s.t. α − α ≥ b α}.
Finally, for any set X ⊆ Rm, the boundary of X is deﬁned as ∂X ≡
{x ∈ X | @x0 ∈ X s.t. x0 >x },a n dcoX is the convex hull of the set X.
Consider a generalisation of Roemer’s (1982) subsistence economy. Let
N be the set of agents, with generic element ν.A l la g e n t sν ∈ N have access
t ot h es a m et e c h n o l o g yP, but they possess diﬀerent endowments ων,w h o s e
distribution in the economy is given by (ων)ν∈N ∈ RNm
+ .A n a g e n t ν ∈ N
endowed with ων can engage in three types of economic activity: she can sell
h e rl a b o u rp o w e rγν







P,o rs h ec a nw o r ko nh e ro w no p e r a t i n gαν =( −αν
0,−αν,αν) ∈ P.G i v e na
price vector p ∈ Rm
+ and a nominal wage rate w,i ti sa s s u m e dt h a te a c ha g e n t
chooses her activities, αν, βν,a n dγν
0, in order to minimise the labour she
expends subject to earning enough income to purchase a subsistence vector
of commodities b ∈ Rm
+ .M o r e o v e r ,s h em u s tb ea b l et ol a yo u ti na d v a n c e
the operating costs for the activities she chooses to operate, either with her
own labour or with hired labour, using her wealth, and she cannot work more
than her labour endowment.
12For all vectors x =( x1,...,x m) and y =( y1,...,y m) ∈ Rm, x = y if and only if
xi = yi (i =1 ,...,m); x ≥ y if and only if x = y and x 6= y; x>yif and only if xi >y i
(i =1 ,...,m).
9Formally, given (p,w), every agent chooses (αν,βν,γν



































Given (p,w),l e tAν (p,w) be the set of actions (αν; βν; γν
0) ∈ P ×P ×[0,1],
which solve ν’s minimisation problem MPν at prices (p,w).
Let a convex cone subsistence economy begivenbyalistE = hN;(P,b);(ων)ν∈Ni.
Let E denote the set of all convex cone subsistence economies. Based on Roe-
mer (1982), the equilibrium notion for an economy E ∈ E can be deﬁned.




,w h e r ep ∈ Rm
+ and w = 0 such that:
(a) ∀ν ∈ N, (αν; βν; γν
0) ∈ Aν (p,w) (individual optimality);
(b) α + β 5 ω (social feasibility),
where α ≡
P
ν∈N αν, β ≡
P
ν∈N β
ν,a n dω ≡
P
ν∈N ων;








(d) b α + b β = Nb (reproducibility),
where b α ≡
P









In other words, at a RS (a) all agents optimise; (b) aggregate capital is suﬃ-
cient for production plans; (c) the labour market is in equilibrium; and (d) net
output is suﬃcient for subsistence. For the sake of brevity, in what follows,






In order to avoid an excess of uninteresting technicalities, it is assumed,
as in Roemer (1982), that agents who are able to reproduce themselves with-
out working use just the amount of wealth strictly necessary to obtain their
subsistence bundle b: in a subsistence economy, wealthy agents have no rea-
son to accumulate or to consume more than b; hence, by stating that they
10do not “waste” their capital, assumption NBC is consistent with capitalist
behaviour.
Non Benevolent Capitalists (NBC): If agent ν has a solution to MPν
with αν
0 +γν
0 =0 ,t h e na g e n tν chooses (αν; βν; γν
0) to minimise pαν +pβ
ν.
It is now possible to prove some preliminary results. Lemma 1 proves
that at a RS, the net revenue constraint binds for all agents.
Lemma 1: Assume NBC. Let (p,w) be a RS for E = hN;(P,b);(ων)ν∈Ni.
Then, pb α




0 = pb for all ν.
The next Lemma proves that the wealth constraint binds for all agents
who work at the solution to MPν.
Lemma 2: Let (p,w) be a RS for E = hN;(P,b);(ων)ν∈Ni such that pb α −
wα0 > 0. For any ν ∈ N,i f αν
0 + γν
0 > 0,t h e npαν + pβ
ν = pων.
For any (p,w) and any α ∈ P,d e ﬁne the proﬁtr a t eπ =
pb α−wα0
pα ,a n d
let πmax =m a x α∈P
pb α−wα0
pα . By optimality, it is immediate to prove that only
production processes yielding the maximal proﬁt rate will be activated. The
next result proves an important property of the set of solutions of MPν.
Lemma 3: Let (p,w) be a price vector such that πmax > 0.I f(αν; βν; γν
0)
solves MPν,t h e n(α0ν; β0ν; γ0ν








The equilibrium price vector can be characterised.
Proposition 1: Let (p,w) be a RS for E = hN;(P,b);(ων)ν∈Ni.T h e n(i)
p ≥ 0 with pb > 0; (ii) πmax = 0; (iii) w>0.
In general convex cone economies it i sn o tp o s s i b l et op r o v et h a ta taR S
the price vector will be strictly positive. In fact, it is possible for some good
to be produced as a joint product without being used as an input.13
13It is reasonable to conjecture that Roemer’s Independence of Production assumption
may yield a strictly positive vector of commodities prices in equilibrium, by requiring that
for any α ∈ P with b α >c= 0, there is another vector α0 ∈ P such that b α
0 = c and
α0 > α0
0 (see Roemer, 1981, Assumption 7, p.47). However, all the arguments in this
paper hold in the more general case and therefore no restriction is needed to guarantee a
strictly positive price vector.
11Proposition 2 derives aggregate net output in equilibrium.
Proposition 2: Let (p,w) be aR Sfor E = hN;(P,b);(ων)ν∈Ni.I fp>0,
then b α+b β = Nb. Conversely, if b αi+b βi >Nb i for some good i,t h e npi =0 .
The next result derives the optimal amount of labour expended by every
a g e n ta taR S .
Proposition 3: Let (p,w) be a RS for E = hN;(P,b);(ων)ν∈Ni.T h e n ,
αν
0 + γν
0 =m a x {0,
pb−πmaxpων
w } for all ν.
By Proposition 3, it follows that agent ν will not work at the optimal solution
if and only if pων =
pb
πmax, which implies πmax > 0.
3 Exploitation and Class in Convex Subsis-
tence Economies
The concept of exploitation in a general convex economy can now be intro-
duced. First of all, if exploitation is conceived of as involving an unequal
exchange of labour (or simply as labour exploitation), it is necessary to iden-
tify the normative benchmark, that is the normatively relevant amount of
labour involved in the exchange, which is usually deﬁned as the labour value
of an agent’s ‘labour power.’ Agent ν is said to be exploited (resp. an ex-
ploiter)i fs h ep e r f o r m smore (resp. less) labour than the labour value of her
‘labour power.’ The amount of labour expended by the agent is unambigu-
ously Λν ≡ αν
0 +γν
0, but there are various ways of deﬁning the value of labour
power, which is related to some reference bundle of commodities (e.g., that
the agent does or can purchase). For any bundle c ∈ Rm
+, the labour value
of c must be deﬁned. Unlike in standard Leontief economies, the deﬁnition
of the labour value of c is not obvious, and various deﬁnitions have, in fact,
been proposed (see Yoshihara, 2007, for a thorough discussion). Following
are the most relevant ones discussed in the literature.
Deﬁnition 2 has been proposed by Morishima (1974). It suggests that the
labour value of a given bundle of goods corresponds to the minimum amount
of labour necessary to produce that bundle as net output. Given c ∈ Rm
+,l e t
φ(c) ≡ {α ∈ P | b α = c}.
12Deﬁnition 2 [Morishima (1974)]: Let c ∈ Rm
+ be a given nonnegative bundle
of commodities. Then, the labour value of c is given by:
l.v.(c)=m i n {α0 ∈ R+|α ∈ φ(c)}.
The next Deﬁnition has been proposed by Roemer (1982). It suggests that
the labour value of a given bundle of goods corresponds to the minimum
amount of labour necessary to produce that bundle as net output using a
proﬁt-rate maximising technique. Given a price vector (p,w),l e t
P (p,w) ≡
½
α =( −α0,−α,α) ∈ P |






Deﬁnition 3 [Roemer (1982)]: Let c ∈ Rm
+ be a given nonnegative bundle
of commodities. Then, the labour value of c is given by
l.v.(c;p,w)=m i n {α0 ∈ R+|α ∈ P(p,w) ∩ φ(c)}.
Instead of discussing the virtues and limitations of existing deﬁnitions
of exploitation, and possibly introducing a new one, this paper adopts a
novel approach and suggests starting from ﬁrst principles, by deﬁning the
desirable properties that any deﬁnition of exploitation should satisfy. At the
most general level, the UE notion of exploitation aims to describe a relational
property of a given social structure by focusing on the distribution of labour
associated to a given resource allocation. In principle, there are many possible
alternative deﬁnitions of exploitation, but one might argue that there should
be some common structure characterising all forms of exploitation as the UE
of labour, which characterises an admissible class of deﬁnitions. The next
axiom represents a domain condition which precisely identiﬁes the admissible
domain of all forms of exploitation, thus specifying the relevant framework
for the discussion of the properties of UE exploitation in the rest of the
paper. Let B (p,b) ≡
©
c ∈ Rm
+ | pc = pb
ª
: B (p,b) is the set of bundles that
cost exactly as much as the subsistence vector at prices p.T h e n :
Labour Exploitation in Subsistence Economies (LES): Let (p,w) be
aR Sf o rE = hN;(P,b);(ων)ν∈Ni.T w os u b s e t sNter ⊆ N and Nted ⊆ N,
Nter ∩ Nted = ∅, constitute the set of exploiters and the set of exploited
agents if and only if there exist c,c ∈ B (p,b) such that there exist αc ∈ φ(c)
with b α
c = c and αc ∈ φ(c) with b α
c = c such that α
c
0 = αc











13Axiom LES requires that, at any RS, the sets Nter and Nted are char-
acterised by identifying two (possibly identical) reference commodity vectors
c,c ∈ Rm
+ . Both reference bundles c and c can be purchased by the consumer
and they identify the value of labour power. Thus, if an agent ν ∈ N op-
timally works Λν to earn the income necessary to purchase the subsistence
bundle b,a n dΛν is less (resp. more) than the labour expended to produce c
(resp. c), then she is regarded as expending less (resp.m o r e )l a b o u rt h a nt h e
‘value of labour power.’ According to LES, the set of such agents coincides
with Nter (resp. Nted).
As the domain condition for the admissible class of exploitation-forms,
LES captures the essential insights of the UE theory of exploitation in con-
vex subsistence economies.14 Given any deﬁnition of exploitation, the sets
Nter and Nted are identiﬁed: in the UE approach, the two sets, and the ex-
ploitation status of each agent ν, are determined by the diﬀerence between
t h ea m o u n to fl a b o u rt h a tν ‘contributes’ to the economy, in some relevant
sense, and the amount she ‘receives’, in some relevant sense. In convex subsis-
tence economies, the former quantity is unambiguously given by the amount
of labour performed, Λν, whereas there are many possible UE views concern-
ing the amount of labour that each agent receives, which incorporate diﬀerent
normative and positive concerns. As a domain condition, LES incorporates
the main features of UE theory that are shared by all the main approaches
proposed in the literature.
First, according to LES, the amount of labour that each agent receives
depends on their equilibrium income, or more precisely, it is determined in
equilibrium by some reference consumption vectors that agents can purchase.
In the standard approach, the reference vector is unique and it corresponds to
the bundle actually chosen by the agent. LES is much weaker in that allows
for more than one reference vector and it only requires that the reference
vectors be potentially aﬀordable, even if they are not actually purchased.
Second, LES captures another key tenet of the UE theory of exploitation
by stipulating that the amount of labour associated with each reference bun-
dle - and thus potentially ‘received’ an agent - is related to the production
conditions of the economy. More precisely, LES states that the reference
bundles be technologically feasible as net output, and it deﬁnes their labour
14It should be stressed that LES only applies to labour-based deﬁnitions of exploitation.
It is not relevant, for example, for Roemer’s property-relations deﬁnition of exploitation
that emphasises inequalities in ownership of productive assets. Similar versions of LES
can be deﬁned in diﬀerent economies; see Yoshihara (2007).
14‘content’ as the amount of labour necessary to produce them. Thus, the
amount of labour ‘received’ by each agent - or, in the standard terminology,
the value of labour power - is a function of the amount of social labour that
is allocated to agents. It is worth noting that LES requires that the amount
of labour associated with each reference bundle be uniquely determined with
reference to production conditions, but it does not specify how such amount
should be chosen, and there may be in principle many alternative ways of




To be sure, one might argue that an even weaker version of LES should
be imposed which allows for more than two reference bundles, and associated
labour amounts, as well as for heterogeneous bundles across individuals. For
example, one may argue that all aﬀordable bundles should be considered.
Although the objection may be important in principle, the restrictions on
reference bundles are arguably mild and reasonable in the economies con-
s i d e r e di nt h i sp a p e r ,a n dt h ea x i o mLES can be generalised. If individual
exploitation status is monotonic in labour performed, ceteris paribus, then all
the relevant information to determine exploitation status can be summarised
in at most two reference bundles, and the associated amounts of labour. Sim-
ilarly, although LES might be generalised to include agent-speciﬁc reference
bundles, this is redundant in the context of convex subsistence economies
with agents of identical preference.
Finally, it is worth noting that the vectors c and c in LES need not
be uniquely ﬁxed, and may be functions of (p,w) and b. Further, once c




0 is necessary for Nter and Nted to be disjoint in every
possible economy.
Various deﬁnitions of labour exploitation proposed in the literature are
discussed below, which satisfy LES. These deﬁnitions may be partitioned
into two main approaches, depending on how the value of labour power is
deﬁned. In what may be deﬁned as the direct approach,t h ev a l u eo fl a b o u r
power is deﬁned as the labour value of the bundles that agents actually
consume, whatever the deﬁnition of labour value is. In the indirect approach,
instead, the value of labour power is deﬁned as the labour value of some
reference bundle that agents can aﬀord with their subsistence income, even
though they do not necessarily purchase it.
Two deﬁn i t i o n st h a tf o l l o wt h eﬁrst approach are considered. The ﬁrst one
is an application to subsistence economies (in which every agent consumes
the bundle b) of Morishima’s (1974) classical deﬁnition.
15Deﬁnition 4: Let (p,w) be a RS for E = hN;(P,b);(ων)ν∈Ni.A g e n t ν
is exploited if and only if Λν >l . v . (b);s h ei sa nexploiter if and only if
Λν <l . v . (b);a n ds h ei sneither exploited nor an exploiter if and only if
Λν = l.v.(b).
Deﬁnition 4 satisﬁes LES by choosing c = c = b,w h e r eαc = αc is cho-
sen to satisfy αc
0 = α
c
0 = l.v.(b). The second deﬁnition is a reﬁnement of
Morishima’s and is due to Roemer (1982).
Deﬁnition 5: Let (p,w) be a RS for E = hN;(P,b);(ων)ν∈Ni.A g e n tν is
exploited if and only if Λν >l . v . (b;p,w);s h ei sa nexploiter if and only if
Λν <l . v . (b;p,w);a n ds h ei sneither exploited nor an exploiter if and only if
Λν = l.v.(b;p,w).
Denote the production vector α ∈ P(p,w) with α0 = l.v.(c;p,w) by α(c).
Deﬁnition 5 satisﬁes LES by choosing c = c = b α(b) with αc = αc = α(b),o r
c = c = b with αc = αc =( α0 (b),α(b),α(b)+b).
As an illustration of the second approach, two deﬁnitions are discussed.
The ﬁrst has been proposed by Yoshihara (2007):
Deﬁnition 6: Let (p,w) be a RS for E = hN;(P,b);(ων)ν∈Ni.A g e n tν ∈ N
is exploited if and only if Λν > minc∈B(p,b) l.v.(c;p,w);s h ei sa nexploiter if
and only if Λν < minc∈B(p,b) l.v.(c;p,w),a n ds h ei sneither exploited nor an
exploiter if and only if Λν =m i n c∈B(p,b) l.v.(c;p,w).
Let c∗ =a r gm i n c∈B(p,b) l.v.(c;p,w).D e ﬁnition 6 satisﬁes LES by choosing
c = c = b α(c∗) with αc = αc = α(c∗),o rc = c = c∗ with αc = αc =
(α0 (c∗),α(c∗),α(c∗)+c∗).
The second example of the indirect approach is an extension of the so
called “New Interpretation,” originally developed by Dumenil and Foley [Du-
menil (1980); Foley (1982)]15 to convex cone economies, which has been pro-
posed by Yoshihara (2007). Let (p,w) be a RS and let α + β be the corre-
sponding aggregate production point. Let t ∈ [0,1] be such that t
³




Deﬁnition 7 : Let (p,w) be a RS for E = hN;(P,b);(ων)ν∈Ni.A g e n t
ν ∈ N is exploited if and only if Λν >t(α0 + β0);s h ei sa nexploiter if and
15See also Lipietz (1982); for a recent survey see Mohun (2004).
16only if Λν <t(α0 + β0),a n ds h ei sneither exploited nor an exploiter if and
only if Λν = t(α0 + β0).
Deﬁnition 7 satisﬁes LES by choosing c = c = 1
N
³
b α + b β
´
with αc = αc =
1
N (α + β) and t = 1
N.
Although the most important deﬁnitions of exploitation proposed in the
literature satisfy LES, the axiom is by no means trivial. Consider for in-
stance the deﬁnition of exploitation proposed by Matsuo (2008), according
t ow h i c ha na g e n tw h oc o n s u m e sc is exploited if there is a feasible bundle
that is at least as good as c, in utility terms, that can be produced using less
labour than is actually expended by the agent. This deﬁnition does not seem
immediately relevant in the framework of this paper, because by the sub-
sistence hypothesis, the agents’ utility functions are not strictly increasing
in consumption, thus contradicting one of Matsuo’s assumptions. However,
one may deﬁne labour value àl aMatsuo counterfactually by asking what
would be the minimum amount of labour necessary to reach a given level of
utility, if agents were endowed with a continuous, strictly increasing utility
function u : Rm
+ → R deﬁned over consumption goods. In this case, it can be
shown that Matsuo’s deﬁnition of exploitation does not satisfy LES. To see
this, consider the following example, which also illustrates the implications
of LES.16









12 12 6 0
¸
, L =( 1 ,1,1,1).
where, following usual notational conventions, A is the input matrix, B is the
output matrix, and L i st h ed i r e c tl a b o u rv e c t o r .T h ec o r r e s p o n d i n gp r o d u c -
tion possibility set is P(A,B,L) ≡
©
α ∈ R− × R2
− × R2
+ | ∃x ∈ R4
+ : α 5 (−Lx,−Ax,Bx)
ª
.
Then, consider a convex cone subsistence economy E ∈ E deﬁned by P(A,B,L),
b =( 2 ,2),a n dω =( N,N).L e t(ων)ν∈N be such that ων =( δν,δν),w h e r e
δν 5 2 for all ν ∈ N,a n dων0 =( 2 ,2) for some ν0 ∈ N.
16Alternatively, the function u may be interpreted as an objective measure of material
welfare deriving from consumption, rather than a representation of workers’ subjective
preferences. This interpretation is consistent with the equilibrium notion adopted in this
paper. A detailed analysis of Matsuo’s approach, and a discussion of recent developments
in exploitation theory is in Yoshihara and Veneziani (2009).
17Let ej ∈ R4
+ be a unit column vector with 1 in the j-th component and
0 in every other component. Consider four reference production processes:
α1 ≡ (−Le1,−Ae1,Be1), α2 ≡ (−Le2,−Ae2,Be2), α3 ≡ (−Le3,−Ae3,Be3),
and α4 ≡ (−Le4,−Ae4,Be4), such that b α
1 ≡ (0,8), b α
2 ≡ (4,8), b α
3 ≡ (4,4),
and b α









In this economy, p =( 1 ,0) and w =2constitute a RS,w i t hαν =0 ,
βν = δνα3
2 ,a n dγν
0 =1 − δν
2 for all ν ∈ N. The corresponding aggre-
gate production is α + β = Nα3
2 . Note that, for each agent, B (p,b)= ©
c ∈ R2
+ | ∃x ∈ R+ : c =( 2 ,x)
ª
.
According to Matsuo (2008), the commodity vector which serves to deﬁne
the value of labour power is given by:
c
M ≡ arg min
c∈R2
+ , α∈P
α0 subject to b α = c & u(c) = u(b).










,w h i c h
implies pcM <p b .T h u s ,cM / ∈ B (p,b), which implies that exploitation àl a
Matsuo does not satisfy LES.
Let Wν ≡ pων. Theorem 1 characterises the exploitation status of every
agent, based on their initial wealth Wν,f o rall deﬁnitions of exploitation
satisfying axiom LES.
Theorem 1: Let (p,w) be a RS for E = hN;(P,b);(ων)ν∈Ni such that
πmax > 0. Then, for any formulation of labour exploitation satisfying LES:
(i) agent ν is an exploiter if and only if Wν > 1
πmax [pb − wαc
0];
(ii) agent ν is exploited if and only if Wν < 1
πmax [pb − wα
c
0]; and
(iii) agent ν is neither an exploiter nor exploited if and only if
1
πmax [pb − wα
c
0] 5 Wν 5 1
πmax [pb − wαc
0].
Theorem 1 is considerably more general than similar results derived by
Roemer (1982), in that it applies to a whole class of deﬁnitions of exploita-
tion, rather than a speciﬁc approach. Thus, for any deﬁnition of exploitation
satisfying axiom LES, Theorem 1 identiﬁes the wealth cut-oﬀst h a tp a r t i -
tion the set of agents based on their exploitation status. Given the analysis
in the previous section, one immediately notes that for each of the Deﬁni-
tions analysed there is a unique wealth cut-oﬀ. Thus, by Theorem 1, under
Deﬁnition 4, exploitation status depends on whether wealth is higher than,
18l o w e rt h a no re q u a lt oW∗ = 1
πmax [pb − w(l.v.(b))]; similarly, under Deﬁn-
ition 5, the wealth cut-oﬀ is W∗ = 1
πmax [pb − w(l.v.(b;p,w))];u n d e rD e ﬁ-
















Actually, minc∈B(p,b) l.v.(c;p,w) 5 l.v.(b;p,w) 5 t(α0 + β0)=
α0+γ0
N ,a n d
l.v.(b) 5 l.v.(b;p,w) for all E ∈ E, and thus the wealth cut-oﬀsc a nb e
ranked. Therefore, ceteris paribus, the set of exploited agents according to
Deﬁnition 7 is (weakly) included in the set of exploited agents according to
Deﬁn i t i o n5 ,w h i c hi si nt u r n( w e a k l y )i n c l u d e di nt h es e to fe x p l o i t e da g e n t s
according to Deﬁnition 4.17
Following Roemer (1982), classes can also be deﬁn e di nt h i se c o n o m y ,
based on the way in which agents relate to the means of production. At a
RS of the subsistence economy, an individually optimal solution for an agent
ν consists of a vector (αν;βν;γν
0). Therefore, let (a1,a 2,a 3) be a vector where
ai = {+,0},i=1 ,2,a n da3 = {+,0},w h e r e“ +” means a non-zero vector in
the appropriate place. Agent ν is said to be a member of class (a1,a 2,a 3),i f
there is an individually optimal (αν;βν;γν
0) which has the form (a1,a 2,a 3).
The notation (+,+,0) implies, for instance, that an agent works in her own
‘shop’ and hires others to work for her; (+,0,+) implies that an agent works
both in her own ‘shop’ and for others, etc. Although there are seven possible
classes in the subsistence economy, it can be proved that at a RS, the set of
producers N can be partitioned into the following ﬁve, theoretically relevant
classes.
C
1 = {ν ∈ N |A
ν (p,w) has a solution of the form (0,+,0)},
C
2 = {ν ∈ N |A
ν (p,w) has a solution of the form (+,+,0)\(+,0,0)},
C
3 = {ν ∈ N |A
ν (p,w) has a solution of the form (+,0,0)},
C
4 = {ν ∈ N |A
ν (p,w) has a solution of the form (+,0,+)\(+,0,0)},
C
5 = {ν ∈ N |A
ν (p,w) has a solution of the form (0,0,+)}.
The notation (+,+,0)\(+,0,0) means that agent ν is a member of class
(+,+,0) but not of class (+,0,0), and likewise for the other classes. As
a ﬁrst step in the analysis of classes, Lemma 4 proves that (+,+,+) and
(0,+,+) are indeed redundant.
17It is worth noting that it is not diﬃcult to construct economies E ∈ E,i nw h i c ht h e
wealth cut-oﬀs are indeed diﬀerent and the inequalities are strict.
19Lemma 4: Let (p,w) be a given price vector. Let ν be such that Wν > 0
and Λν > 0 at the solution of MPν.L e tν belong to either (+,+,+) or



























0),t h e nν ∈ (+,0,+)\(+,0,0).
Given Lemma 4, it is now possible to prove a generalisation of Roemer’s
(1982) core result concerning the correspondence between class status and
wealth. Theorem 2 proves that classes C1 to C5 are pairwise disjoint and
exhaustive, and wealthier agents belong to the upper classes.
Theorem 2: Let (p,w) be a RS for E = hN;(P,b);(ων)ν∈Ni such that
πmax > 0.T h e n :
(i) For any i 6= j, Ci ∩ Cj = ∅ and ∪5
i=1Ci = N;
(ii) For any ν,μ ∈ N,i f ν ∈ Ci and μ ∈ Cj with i<jthen Wν >W μ.
T h e o r e m s1a n d2i d e n t i f yt w od i ﬀerent partitions of the set of agents
based, respectively, on their exploitation status and their relation to the
means of production (more precisely, their position in the labour market).
In both cases, an agent’s wealth is the main determinant of her position in
t h es o c i a ls t r u c t u r e ,a n dt h e r e f o r ei ti sl e g i t i m a t et oa s kw h e t h e rc l a s sa n d
exploitation status are related, as predicted in Marxian theory. This is the
main object of analysis in the next section.
4 The Class-Exploitation Correspondence Prin-
ciple
In classical Marxian theory, exploitation and classes are related: capitalists
are exploiters and proletarians are exploited. On the one hand, this corre-
spondence of class and exploitation status gives a speciﬁcn o r m a t i v er e l e v a n c e
t ot h ec o n c e p to fc l a s s ;o nt h eo t h e rh a n d ,i te m p h a s i s e st h ei m p o r t a n c eo f
relations of production in the generation of exploitation. More formally, the
Class-Exploitation Correspondence Principle (CECP) can be deﬁned as fol-
lows.
20Class-Exploitation Correspondence Principle (CECP) [Roemer (1982)]:
Given any economy E ∈ E,a ta n yR Sw i t hπmax > 0,
(A) every member of C1 ∪ C2 is an exploiter.
(B) every member of C4 ∪ C5 is exploited.
A fundamental contribution of Roemer’s theory is the proof of the CECP
in the private-ownership economy, which is derived as a result of the analy-
sis, rather than being assumed. Epistemologically, though, Roemer forcefully
argues that the central relevance of the CECP in class and exploitation the-
ory implies that it should be considered as a postulate,b yr e q u i r i n gt h a ta n y
satisfactory deﬁnition of exploitation (and classes) satisﬁes the CECP.C o n -
sistently with this approach, this section analyses the CECP under diﬀerent
deﬁnitions of exploitation satisfying LES.
As a ﬁrst step, it is useful to provide a characterisation of class status
in general convex cone subsistence economies. Let (p,w) b eaR Ss u c ht h a t
πmax > 0.L e t αmin ∈ P (p,w) be such that
pαmin






πmaxpαmin + wα0min = pb,a n dl e tαmax ∈ P (p,w) be such that
pαmax






and πmaxpαmax + wα0max = pb.N o t et h a tpαmin 5 pαmax,
and that αmin,αmax are well-deﬁned. The next proposition provides a precise
characterisation of class status based on an agent’s wealth.
Proposition 4: Let (p,w) be a RS for E = hN;(P,b);(ων)ν∈Ni such that
πmax > 0.T h e n ,
(i) ν ∈ C1 ⇔ Wν =
pb
πmax;
(ii) ν ∈ C2 ⇔ pαmax <W ν <
pb
πmax;
(iii) ν ∈ C3 ⇔ pαmin 5 Wν 5 pαmax;a n d
(iv) ν ∈ C4 ⇔ 0 <W ν <p αmin;
(v) ν ∈ C5 ⇔ Wν =0 .
In other words, Proposition 4 derives four wealth cut-oﬀ levels that parti-
tion the set of agents into ﬁve classes. The richest agents are big capitalists,
who can reproduce themselves without working, and the poorest, property-
less agents are proletarians, who can only sell their labour in order to survive.
All other agents fall into the intermediate classes, based on their wealth. In
principle, the wealth cut-oﬀsi d e n t i ﬁed in Proposition 4 may be diﬀerent
from those characterising exploitation status identiﬁed in Theorem 1, which
depend on the actual deﬁnition of exploitation adopted. The next theorem
21provides the general condition for the CECP to hold under any deﬁnition
of exploitation satisfying LES.
Theorem 3: Let (p,w) be a RS for E = hN;(P,b);(ων)ν∈Ni such that
πmax > 0. For any deﬁnition of labour exploitation satisfying LES, the
CECP holds if and only if c,c are such that
pαmin 5
1











Again, Theorem 3 is signiﬁcantly more general than the analogous results
proved by Roemer (1982), in that it provides general necessary and suﬃcient
conditions for the CECP to hold for an entire class of deﬁnitions of exploita-
tion, rather than for a speciﬁc approach. Actually, there is another way of
stating Theorem 3, which may illustrate its signiﬁcance in terms of a deﬁn-
ition of exploitation satisfying LES.L e t(p,w) be a RS with πmax > 0,a n d
let
Γ(p,w) ≡ {α ∈ P | pb α = pb and pb α − wα0 ∈ [π
maxpαmin,π
maxpαmax]}.
Note that Γ(p,w) is the set of feasible production processes yielding a net
output with the same monetary value as the subsistence vector and a proﬁt
revenue equal to the proﬁt revenue under one of the maximal-proﬁt-rate
processes. Similarly, the set of net outputs associated with Γ(p,w) is deﬁned
as follows: b Γ(p,w) ≡
©
b α ∈ Rm
+ | α ∈ Γ(p,w)
ª
. Theorem 3 can be re-stated
a sp r o v i n gt h a ta taR S(p,w) such that πmax > 0, for any deﬁnition of labour
exploitation satisfying LES,t h eCECP holds if and only if c,c ∈ b Γ(p,w).
In other words, for any deﬁnition of labour exploitation satisfying LES,
the CECP holds if and only if the proﬁt revenue associated with the pro-
duction of the reference bundles c and c is equal to the proﬁt revenue under
one of the maximal-proﬁt-rate processes. This characterisation holds regard-
less of whether the amount of labour necessary to produce c,c is minimal or
not, and regardless of whether the net output is actually produced at the RS.
Note that this does not exclude the possibility that the CECP holds under a
labour value formulation with no maximal-proﬁt-rate production process.18
This property is due to the assumption of subsistence economies. In fact,
in the case of accumulation economies, as Yoshihara (2007) shows, if the
18For a proof of this claim see Example A.1 in Appendix 2 below.
22CECP holds under a labour value formulation, then this formulation should
be associated with some maximal-proﬁt-rate production process.19
Let (p,w) be a RS and let Γ(p,w) ≡
©
α ∈ P (p,w) | pb α = pb
ª
: Γ(p,w)
is the set of feasible, maximal-proﬁt-rate production processes yielding a net
output with the same monetary value as the subsistence vector. Similarly,
the set of net outputs associated with Γ(p,w) can be deﬁned as follows:
b Γ(p,w) ≡
©
b α ∈ Rm
+ | α ∈ Γ(p,w)
ª
. Then, noting that b Γ(p,w) ⊆ b Γ(p,w),
the next Corollary immediately follows from Theorem 3.
Corollary 1: Let (p,w) be a RS for E = hN;(P,b);(ων)ν∈Ni such that
πmax > 0. For any formulation of labour exploitation satisfying LES, if its
corresponding c,c are such that c,c ∈ b Γ(p,w),t h e nt h eCECP holds under
this formulation.
Corollary 1 provides suﬃcient conditions for the CECP to hold for any
deﬁnition of labour exploitation satisfying LES. In particular, it states that
the CECP holds if this deﬁnition evaluates the amount of labour necessary to
produce a net output, which has the same monetary value as the subsistence
vector at the RS, by operating one of the maximal-proﬁt-rate processes.
Based on Theorem 3 and Corollary 1, it is possible to prove that the CECP
holds under Deﬁnitions 5, 6, and 7.
Corollary 2: Let (p,w) be a RS for E = hN;(P,b);(ων)ν∈Ni such that
πmax > 0. Then the CECP holds under Deﬁnitions 5, 6, and 7.
Instead, Deﬁnition 4 does not preserve the CECP, because the commod-
ity bundle used to deﬁne the value of labour power under Deﬁnition 4 need
n o tb ep r o d u c e dw i t ht h es a m ep r o ﬁt revenue as that of the maximal-proﬁt-
rate processes. This is shown formally in the following proposition.
Proposition 5: Let exploitation be deﬁned according to Deﬁnition 4. There
is a convex cone, subsistence economy E ∈ E in which there exists a RS with
πmax > 0, such that the CECP does not hold.
In the context of accumulating economies, Roemer (1982; Chapter 5, p.
148) had already suggested that in accumulation economies, if Morishima’s
19Note that Roemer (1982; Chapter 5; p.164) also stated basically the same claim,
though he only discussed the case of exploiters.
23deﬁnition of exploitation is used, then “the CECP i sf a l s ef o rt h ec o n et e c h -
nology” - a claim rigorously proved by Yoshihara (2007). The roots of the
failure of the CECP, however, are diﬀerent in the cases of subsistence and
accumulation economies. In fact, as Roemer (1982) and Yoshihara (2007)
show, in accumulation economies the failure of the CECP is due to the
existence of both non-exploiting capitalists and non-exploited workers. In
contrast, in subsistence economies, as the proof of Proposition 5 in the Ap-
pendix shows, the failure of the CECP is due to the existence of exploited
capitalists.
The results presented in this section are quite relevant for exploitation
theory. Given the epistemological relevance of the CECP discussed above,
Proposition 5 suggests that Morishima’s classical deﬁnition of exploitation is
inadequate to capture the central intuitions of Marxian theory.20 Contrary
to Roemer’s claims, however, Corollary 2 proves that, even in the general
setting analysed in this paper, the CECP does hold for various deﬁnitions of
exploitation presented in the literature. More generally, Theorem 3 suggests
that, for all possible convex subsistence economies and all equilibria, the
CECP holds for a whole class of notions of exploitation as UE of labour
satisfying the arguably weak and reasonable axiom LES.21
Finally, the following equivalence relation can be proved:
Theorem 4: Consider any deﬁnition of exploitation which satisﬁes LES.
Let (p,w) be a RS for E = hN;(P,b);(ων)ν∈Ni and c,c ∈ b Γ(p,w) for this
deﬁnition of exploitation. Then, the following statements are equivalent:
(1) πmax > 0;
(2) the CECP holds;
(3) every producer in C5 is exploited.
Theorem 4 has two important implications for exploitation theory. Firstly,
the equivalence between (1) and (3) represents a signiﬁcant generalisation
of the so-called “Fundamental Marxian Theorem”( FMT) [Roemer (1980,
1981)], according to which the equilibrium maximal proﬁtr a t ei sp o s i t i v ei f
and only if every worker is exploited. The FMT is proved to hold in general
20Actually, Morishima’s deﬁnition has another arguably undesirable property. In fact,
it is not diﬃcult to construct an example of a subsistence economy in which all producers
have the same endowment of capital goods, but they are all exploited in the sense of
Deﬁnition 4, a rather counterintuitive result.
21As shown by Yoshihara (2007), a similar result holds in accumulation economies.
24convex cone economies with a complex class structure and for a whole set of
deﬁnitions of exploitation satisfying axiom LES. This is important because,
as for the CECP, although it is proved as a result, the epistemological
status of the FMT in exploitation theory is usually that of an axiom, and
alternative deﬁnitions of exploitation are often compared in terms of their
ability to preserve it. Actually, one might discuss which axiom - the CECP
or the FMT -i sm o r er e l e v a n ta n dw h e t h e ri m p o s i n gb o t hs i g n i ﬁcantly
decreases the set of available deﬁnitions of exploitation. The second, and
somewhat more surprising, implication of Theorem 4 is that for the whole
class of deﬁnitions of exploitation satifying LES with c,c ∈ b Γ(p,w),t h e
CECP and the FMT are equivalent, and therefore one need not choose
among them: any deﬁnition preserving one, also preserves the other.
5 An Axiomatic Characterisation of Exploita-
tion
The results presented in the previous sections are encouraging: there exist a
set of deﬁnitions of exploitation as the unequal exchange of labour that satisfy
the reasonable condition imposed by LES, and preserve the CECP (and
the FMT) as a result, in the equilibrium of the private-ownership economy.
Furthermore, both LES and the requirement that the CECP holds in general
convex economies are not trivial, and some of the deﬁnitions proposed in
the literature do not satisfy them. In terms of identifying and defending
one deﬁnition of exploitation, however, the analysis developed so far is not
conclusive as it cannot discriminate between a number of competing notions.
In line with the novel axiomatic approach adopted in this paper, the main
purpose of this section is to propose and defend some additional theoretical
conditions that any deﬁnition of labour exploitation should satisfy and then
to provide a characterisation result.
Consider any economy E ∈ E. For any deﬁnition of exploitation satisfying
LES, recall that the corresponding reference bundles c,c ∈ Rm
+ identifying






aR Sf o rE = hN;(P,b);(ων)ν∈Ni and let c,c be the corresponding reference
bundles. Non-exploitative allocations can be deﬁned as follows.






and the corresponding reference bun-
25dles c,c, the allocation (α0ν; β0ν; γ0ν






















0 for all ν ∈ N.
Deﬁnition 8 is a rather weak deﬁnition of non-exploitative allocations,
because it only requires that subsistence be guaranteed and that all labour
required to implement the allocations be available. No constraint is imposed,
instead, on aggregate capital endowments, or on the way in which such allo-
cation can be reached. Arguably, though, non-exploitative allocations that
are within the realm of social feasibility are of focal normative relevance. The
next deﬁnition provides a precise notion of social feasibility.





, an allocation (α0ν; β0ν; γ0ν
0 )ν∈N
is feasible non-exploitative w.r.t (p0,w 0) in E = hN;(P,b);(ων)ν∈Ni if:
(i) the allocation (α0ν; β0ν; γ0ν
0 )ν∈N is non-exploitative at (p,w) and
(ii)
¡
(p0,w 0),(α0ν; β0ν; γ0ν
0 )ν∈N
¢
is a RS for hN;(P,b);(ων)ν∈Ni.
Clearly, the feasibility of a non-exploitative allocation depends on the actual
values of c,c ∈ Rm
+, that is, on the notion of labour exploitation adopted.
T h en e x tD e ﬁnition outlines the concept of eﬃciency that is relevant in
convex subsistence economies.
Deﬁnition 10: An allocation (αν; βν; γν
0)ν∈N ∈ (P × P × [0,1])
N is eﬃ-




















0; and there is no other allocation (α0ν; β0ν; γ0ν
0 )ν∈N
∈ (P × P × [0,1])











In other words, if an allocation is eﬃcient, it is impossible to reduce the
labour time of some agent without increasing the amount of labour expended
by someone else.22 It is also worth noting that if an allocation is eﬃcient
a c c o r d i n gt oD e ﬁnition 10, then even a benevolent social planner cannot
22Thus, Deﬁnition 10 appropriately focuses on the socially relevant phenomenon, namely
the minimisation of labour, but it gives no weight to the behavioural assumption encom-
passed in NBC, according to which big capitalists minimise capital outlay.















some ν∗ ∈ N.
T h en e x ta x i o mr e q u i r e st h a t ,w h a t e v e r the notion of labour exploitation
is, its corresponding non-exploitative allocation should be feasible for each
economy.
Feasibility of Non-exploitation (FNE): Consider a deﬁnition of ex-
ploitation satisfying LES. Given any economy E ∈ E,l e t(p,w) be an
eﬃcient RS and let c,c ∈ Rm
+ be the corresponding reference bundles. If
(α0ν; β0ν; γ0ν






ν∈N ων, then there exists (p0,w 0) such that for some suitable redistribution




ν∈N ων, (α0ν; β0ν; γ0ν
0 )ν∈N is feasi-
ble non-exploitative with respect to (p0,w 0) in hN;(P,b);(ω0ν)ν∈Ni.
FNE is a rather weak and desirable property for all concepts of exploita-
tion. For, ﬁrst, all of the formulations of exploitation discussed in this paper
satisfy it, and second, it requires that if a non-exploitative allocation exists
with the current social endowment, then it must be possible to implement
such an allocation with some appropriate distribution of social endowments.
Arguably, any normatively relevant concept of exploitation should allow for
the existence of non-exploitative allocations. If exploitation could not be
eliminated, then its relevance for the evaluation of capitalist societies would
arguably be diminished, as an evil that agents must learn to live with. Then,
given that an ideal (non-exploitative) allocation is technologically feasible in
terms of Deﬁnitions 1(b), 1(c), and 1(d), FNE would require that it be ra-
tional in terms of Deﬁnitions 1(a). The appeal to markets as the mechanism
to implement non-exploitative allocations may be controversial, but one may
argue that in the context of this paper the usual equivalence between market
allocations and the social planner problem holds. Furthermore, theoretically,
FNE can be seen as requiring that non-exploitation is compatible with the
rational choices of individuals. To be precise, since the CECP shows that
the emergence of class and exploitation is the consequence of rational choice
of individuals, the FNE guarantees that the emergence of class and exploita-
tion is not a necessary condition for rational choice of individuals, because
non-exploitation is also required to be compatible with rational choices. More
pragmatically, thus far, markets have proved to be the only sustainable, de-
centralised decision-making allocation mechanism in the sense of Hurwicz
27(1972), and, absent a viable alternative, this justiﬁes what may seem an ex-
cessively narrow focus. Furthermore, FNE is interesting also in relation to
recent proposals of market socialism as a mechanism to combine eﬃciency
and social justice, including the elimination of exploitation (see, e.g., Roe-
mer, 1994). Actually, as shown below, at the level of abstraction at which
this analysis is conducted, the focus on markets allows one to introduce some
important issues concerning the relation between exploitation and eﬃciency.
In addition to FNE, the following axiom is a natural requirement for any
deﬁnition of exploitation:
Independence of Endowment Structure (IES): Consider a deﬁnition of
exploitation satisfying LES. Given two economies E = hN;(P,b);(ων)ν∈Ni









be their corresponding RSs such that
P
ν∈N (αν + βν)= P
ν∈N (α0ν + β0ν).M o r e o v e r ,l e tc,c ∈ Rm
+ and c0,c 0 ∈ Rm
+ be the correspond-
ing reference bundles. Then, c = c0 and c = c0.
Axiom IES implies that the reference commodity bundles may depend on
the price vector (p,w) and the equilibrium social production point αp,w of the
given RS, but they should be independent of the allocation of production ac-
tivity vectors, which are determined by the underlying endowment structure.
This condition seems uncontroversial and indeed all the main deﬁnitions of
exploitation discussed in the literature satisfy it.
Finally, the following axiom captures an arguably essential feature of any
theory of exploitation.
Relational Exploitation (RE): Consider a deﬁnition of exploitation sat-
isfying LES.A ta n yR Sf o rhN;(P,b);(ων)ν∈Ni,t h et w os u b s e t sNterand
Nted are such that Nter 6= ∅ if and only if Nted 6= ∅.
From a formal viewpoint, axiom RE imposes a rather weak restriction on
LES. From a theoretical viewpoint, it captures the crucial relational aspect
inherent in exploitative relations, such that if an agent is exploited, she must
be exploited by someone, and viceversa if an exploiter exists, she must be
exploiting someone.
Before proving the main Theorem of this section, which provides a com-
plete axiomatic characterisation of exploitation, some intermediate results
are derived, which are also interesting in their own right. First of all, the
28next Lemma proves that all RS’s in which the wealth constraints bind, are















ν∈N pων,t h e n(αν; βν; γν
0)ν∈N is eﬃcient.
Lemma 5 suggests that the scarcity of capital is a suﬃcient condition for
eﬃciency in equilibrium. Yet, it does not rule out the possibility of ineﬃcient












ν∈N pων,t h e n(αν; βν; γν
0)ν∈N is not necessarily eﬃcient. Formally, it is
not possible to prove a Marxist version of the First Welfare Theorem because
local nonsatiation may be violated in this economy for all those agents who
do not work at the optimum. In fact, a necessary condition for a RS to be
ineﬃcient is the existence of big capitalists who can reproduce themselves
without working, and who maintain capital scarcity “artiﬁcially” by min-
imising capital outlay, consistently with the assumption NBC.A ne x a m p l e
of an ineﬃcient RS in a convex subsistence economy is discussed in detail in
Appendix 3 below and the role of big capitalists is shown. This is an inter-
esting case, as it suggests a relation between ineﬃciencies and extreme forms
of injustice, viz. exploitative social relations. From a normative perspective,
however, this is the least challenging case since there is no trade-oﬀ, at least
locally, between an improvement in eﬃciency and a reduction of social in-
justices, namely exploitation. Even from a Marxian viewpoint, it may be
argued that exploitation theory should focus on the amount of labour time
necessary to produce the subsistence bundle by adopting eﬃcient production
techniques.
Proposition 6 proves that the amount of labour performed is uniquely
determined at all eﬃcient equilibria of the subsistence economy.
Proposition 6: Let E = hN;(P,b);(ων)ν∈Ni and E0 = hN;(P,b);(ω0ν)ν∈Ni











(p0,w 0),(α0ν; β0ν; γ0ν
0 )ν∈N
¢
be two eﬃcient RSs for E and E0, respec-
tively. Then α0 + γ0 = α0
0 + γ0
0.
According to Proposition 6, for a given vector of aggregate productive assets,
the amount of labour performed is independent of the distribution of endow-
ments and it is equalised across all eﬃcient RS’s. The next Lemma, instead,
focuses on eﬃcient and resource-egalitarian equilibria and proves that if an
eﬃcient RS exists, then the same price vector supports an egalitarian RS in
29which all individuals have the same vector of productive endowments and















ν∈N pων.T h e n
¡
(p,w),(α0ν;0 ;0 ) ν∈N
¢
is
a RS for E0 = hN;(P,b);(ω0ν)ν∈Ni,w h e r eα0ν =
P
ν∈N(αν+βν)
N and ω0ν = ω
N
for all ν ∈ N.
Given the new axioms, FNE, RE,a n dIES, the following characterisa-
tions can be derived.
Theorem 5: A formulation of labour exploitation satisﬁes LES, FNE, RE,






T h e o r e m5c a nt h u sb et a k e na sp r o v i d i n gs u p p o r tt ot h ee x t e n s i o no f
Dumenil-Foley’s “New Interpretation” (Deﬁnition 7) as the appropriate de-
ﬁnition of exploitation, which is uniquely characterised from a rather small
set of arguably weak axioms.24 Actually, Theorem 5 has a rather striking
implication: because, as shown above, virtually all of the most relevant deﬁ-
nitions of exploitation proposed in the literature such as Deﬁn i t i o n s4 ,5 ,6 ,
and 7 satisfy axioms LES, FNE,a n dIES,i ti st h er a t h e rm i l da x i o mRE -
which requires the presence of exploiters, whenever some agent is exploited
- that rules out all alternative deﬁnitions except Deﬁnition 7. By Theorem
5, not all deﬁnitions of exploitation satisfy these reasonable properties, and
indeed our axiomatic analysis allows us to precisely identify the limits of the
received deﬁnitions of exploitation: if Morishima’s celebrated deﬁnition is
adopted, for example, it is not diﬃcult to construct examples in which RE
is violated and all agents are exploited.
Interestingly, however, even the adoption of a more traditional stance em-
phasising the importance of the notions of surplus labour and socially neces-
sary labour time in exploitation theory, rather than the relational property
incorporated in RE, does not rescue the main received deﬁnitions of exploita-
tion. In particular, following classical approaches to exploitation theory, it
23Such a characterisation by using RE still holds if RE is weakened so that its require-
ment is imposed only on any RS with a positive proﬁtr a t e .
24It is worth noting that under Deﬁnitions 4 and 5, there indeed exist some E ∈ E and
some RS (p,w), such that l.v.(b) 6=
α0+β0
N and l.v.(b α(b);p,w) 6=
α0+β0
N ,s ot h a tT h e o r e m5
does capture a fundamental diﬀerence between alternative deﬁnitions.
30may be argued that Socially Necessary Labour corresponds to the minimum
amount of labour necessary to produce the subsistence consumption bundle
and this quantity is an important theoretical benchmark, such that the refer-
ence labour expenditures αc
0,α
c
0 that identify exploiters and exploited agents
should be no lower than socially necessary labour. More formally:
Exploitation as Eﬃcient Use of Labour (EEUL): Consider a deﬁnition




be a RS such that c,c ∈ Rm
+ are the corresponding




In the canonical Marxian theory of exploitation in the Okishio-Leontief




0 = l.v.(b),i ti d e n t i ﬁes the sets of exploiters and exploited agents. Axiom
EEUL generalises such a theory to convex subsistence economies, and in fact,
this axiom represents a condition which the classical Marxian theory of labour
value and exploitation satisﬁes if a subsistence economy hN;(P,b);(ων)ν∈Ni
is characterised by a simple Leontief technology P = P(A,I,L),w h e r eA and I
are square matrices. However, this is a rather weak requirement in the sense
that most of the formulations of exploitation discussed in this paper satisfy
it.
In order to derive the characterisation result, it is necessary to slightly
modify the axiom FNE.
Feasibility of Non-exploitation∗ (FNE∗): Consider a deﬁnition of ex-
ploitation satisfying LES. Given any economy E ∈ E,l e t(p,w) be an ef-
ﬁcient RS and let c,c ∈ Rm
+ be the corresponding reference bundles. Then,
for any non-exploitative allocation (α0ν; β0ν; γ0ν
0 )ν∈N at (p,w),t h e r ee x i s t s
(p0,w 0) such that for some suitable redistribution (ω0ν)ν∈N of (ων)ν∈N with P
ν∈N ω0ν =
P
ν∈N ων, (α0ν; β0ν; γ0ν
0 )ν∈N is feasible non-exploitative with
respect to (p0,w 0) in hN;(P,b);(ω0ν)ν∈Ni.
FNE∗ is slightly stronger than FNE, because it does not focus on non-
exploitative allocations at the givel level of social endowments: implementabil-
ity is imposed regardless of whether the non-exploitative allocation is physi-
cally feasible in the current economy or not.
Given FNE∗, it is now possible to derive an alternative characterisation
of Deﬁnition 7.
31Theorem 6: A formulation of labour exploitation satisﬁes LES, FNE∗,






In other words, one may argue that there are two possible views on exploita-
tion. One is that exploitation is a notion that characterises social relations in
market economies, as described by axiom RE. Alternatively, one may insist
that exploitation theory is based on a notion of ‘surplus labour’ and socially
necessary labour. Quite surprisingly, Theorems 5 and 6 prove that the two
approaches coincide in the rather general context analysed in this paper and
our extension of Dumenil-Foley’s “New Interpretation” (Deﬁnition 7) is the
only deﬁnition incorporating both perspectives.
Finally, from Theorems 3 and 5, the next result follows:
Corollary 3: Deﬁnition 7 is the sole formulation of labour exploitation sat-
isfying LES, FNE, RE, and IES, a n du n d e rw h i c ht h eCECP holds at
every RS (p,w) with πmax > 0 for all E ∈ E.
Thus, the extension of Dumenil-Foley’s “New Interpretation” (Deﬁnition 7)
is the sole formulation of exploitation which satisﬁes all axioms and which
preserves an important property of exploitation theory, namely the CECP
in general convex economies. Of course, a similar corollary can be derived
using Theorem 6.
6C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
This paper provides a formal analysis of exploitation in convex cone subsis-
tence economies with rational optimising agents. The distributive injustice
associated with exploitative relations is rigorously explored and the relevance
of a notion of exploitation that emphasises the unequal exchange of labour is
defended. Firstly, a deﬁnition of exploitation is provided according to which
exploitative relations involve an unequal distribution of (and control over)
social labour, consistently with a normative approach that focuses on indi-
vidual well-being freedom and the self-realisation of men. The main results
of Roemer’s classical theory are generalised and it is proved that this deﬁni-
tion - actually, a whole class of deﬁnitions of exploitation - preserves all the
classical Marxist insights on exploitation in a framework that is considerably
more general than the standard Leontief, or von Neumann economies: every
32agent’s class and exploitation status emerges in the competitive equilibrium;
there is a correspondence between an agent’s class and exploitation status;
and the existence of exploitation is inherently linked to the existence of pos-
itive proﬁts. Thus, many important properties of exploitation theory are
shown to be considerably more robust than is generally thought.
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, unlike in the previous litera-
ture, this paper develops a new, axiomatic approach to exploitation theory.
The core intuitions behind the concept of exploitation are thus directly ad-
dressed, in order to derive the appropriate deﬁnition of exploitation from
ﬁrst principles, rather than from ad hoc attempts to eschew a number of
technical or theoretical problems. The main positive and normative aspects
of exploitation theory are explicitly formalised in a set of axioms that every
labour-based deﬁnition of exploitation should arguably satisfy. The axioms
seem rather weak and reasonable, but they uniquely characterise the deﬁni-
tion of exploitation adopted in the paper, which focuses on the distribution
of social labour and which, quite interestingly, is conceptually related to the
so-called “New-Interpretation” (Dumenil, 1980; Foley, 1982).
To be sure, the main results presented above hold in the rather large class
of convex cone, subsistence economies considered in the paper, but nothing
is said, for example, concerning economies in which agents accumulate, or
have richer, and possibly heterogeneous preferences. The extension of the
analysis to diﬀerent contexts, or under alternative assumptions concerning
agents’ behaviour, indeed represents an interesting line for further research,
but two important points should be made concerning the contributions of
this paper. Firstly, although the details of the analysis are likely to change if
diﬀerent economies are analysed, the main insights of the paper, concerning
the normative and positive relevance of exploitation and the appropriate
deﬁnition of exploitation, would not be aﬀected: they seem independent of
the speciﬁc (subsistence) framework and their relevance seems to extend
beyond the latter. Thus, for example, even if agents are allowed to consume
diﬀerent bundles of goods, an appropriate deﬁnition may still be seen as
identifying a normatively relevant ref e r e n c eb u n d l e-s u c ha st h e‘ a v e r a g e
consumption bundle’ or the per-capita value of net domestic product - and
requiring that the value of labour power be measured accordingly. Secondly,
and perhaps more importantly, the rigorous axiomatic analysis developed in
this paper suggests a fruitful methodological approach to exploitation that
c a nb ea p p l i e dt od i ﬀerent contexts, and that should frame any future debates
in exploitation theory.
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7.1 Appendix 1: The existence of a RS
This appendix provides a complete characterisation of reproducible solutions.
Without loss of generality, let S ≡
©
p ∈ Rm
+ | pb =1
ª
be the set of normalised
price vectors. Let α0 (ω) ≡ max{α0 | ∃α =( −α0,−α,α) ∈ P s.t. α 5 ω}.
Given the production set P,l e te P ≡
©







+ | ∃α ∈ P : α 5 ω, α − Nb= α, α − Nb≯ α & (−α0,Nb+ α) ∈ ∂ e P
o
.
That is, ω ∈ C implies that there exists a production vector that is feasible
from ω and produces Nbas net output. Moreover, such a production point is
weakly eﬃcient in the sense that (−α0,Nb+ α) ∈ ∂ e P.N o t et h a tb yA 1 vA3,
C is non-empty, closed, and convex.
In order to provide a full characterisation of RS’s, two more sets must
be deﬁned. Given the production set P and the scalar w = 1,l e te P (w) ≡ ©
α − wα0b ∈ Rm







+ | ∃α ∈ P & ∃w = 1:α 5 ω, α − Nb= α, α − Nb≯ α,
& Nb+ α − wα0b ∈ ∂ e P (w)
o
.
That is, ω ∈ C∗ implies that there exists a production vector that is
feasible from ω and produces Nb as net output. Moreover, its associated
‘surplus product’ Nb−wα0b is a non-negative vector for some w = 1. Finally,
such a production point is also weakly eﬃcient in the sense that Nb+ α −
wα0b ∈ ∂ e P (w) for some w = 1.N o t et h a tC∗ ⊆ C and by A1vA3, C∗ is also
non-empty, closed, and convex. Theorem A.1 proves a necessary condition
for a RS to exist.
Theorem A.1: Let b ∈ Rm
++ , ω ∈ Rm
+ .U n d e rA 1 vA3, if a reproducible
solution (RS) exists for the economy E = hN;(P,b);(ων)ν∈Ni then ω ∈ C.
Furthermore, if there is some agent ν with pων =0 ,t h e nω ∈ C∗.
Proof. 1. Let (p,w) be a RS with its corresponding aggregate pro-
duction vector α + β ∈ P,a n ds u c ht h a tp ∈ S.F i r s t , α + β 5 ω
and α + β − Nb = α + β immediately follow from Deﬁnition 1(b)-(c).
34Next, Propositions 1(i) and 2 imply that α + β − Nb ≯ α + β . Finally,
at the RS, πmax =
pNb−w(α0+β0)
p(α+β) , and by Proposition 2, it is possible to




= pω, and therefore
1+πmax =
pNλb+pλ(α+β)−wλ(α0+β0)












∈ e P such that pα0 = pω.
Therefore
¡




∈ ∂ e P and (p,w) is a supporting






∈ ∂ e P and
(p,w) is a supporting price of it.
2. Suppose there is some agent ν with pων =0 .T h eﬁr s tp a r to ft h ep r o o f
is as in step 1. Then note that since p ∈ S and the upper bound of labour
supply is one, it follows that w = 1, for otherwise agent ν with pων =0
cannot survive even if she supplies the maximum amount of labour. Finally,




= pω holds. Then,
1+πmax =
pNλb+pλ(α+β)−wλ(α0+β0)





wλ(α0 + β0) = pb α
0 + pα0 − wα0
0 for all b α
0 + α0 − wα0
0b ∈ e P (w) such that
pα0 = pω. Moreover, since πmax = 0 at a RS and Lemma 1 holds, it follows
from b ∈ Rm





− λw(α0 + β0)b ∈ ∂ e P (w) and p ∈ S is a supporting price of it.




− w(α0 + β0)b ∈ ∂ e P (w) and
p ∈ S is a supporting price of it.




+ | ∃α ∈ P & ∃w = 1:α = ω, α − Nb= α, α − Nb≯ α,
& Nb+ α − wα0b ∈ ∂ e P (w)
o
.
Within this domain, the existence of a RS can be proved. For any given ω
∈ C∗∗,d e ﬁne the set
A(ω) ≡ n
α ∈ P& w = 1 | α = ω,α − Nb= α,α − Nb≯ α,& Nb+ α − wα0b ∈ ∂ e P (w)
o
.
Theorem A.2: Let b ∈ Rm
++ , ω ∈ Rm
+ and α0 (ω) 5 N.U n d e r A 1 vA3,
if ω ∈ C∗∗ then there exists (α∗,w) ∈ A(ω) such that there exists p ∈ S
that supports Nb+ α∗ − wα∗
0b ∈ ∂ e P (w) in e P (w).F u r t h e r m o r e ,i f(ων)ν∈N
35is such that
P
ν∈N ων = ω and pb − πmaxpων = 0 for all ν ∈ N,t h e na
reproducible solution (RS) exists for the economy E = hN;(P,b);(ων)ν∈Ni
at (p,w).
Proof. 1. By deﬁnition, if ω ∈ C∗∗,t h e r ee x i s t sα∗ =( −α∗
0,−α∗,α∗) ∈ P
such that α∗ = ω, α∗ − Nb = α∗ with α∗ − Nb ≯ α∗,a n dNb + α∗ −
wα∗
0b ∈ ∂ e P (w) for some w = 1. Therefore the aggregate production vector
α∗ satisﬁes Deﬁnition 1, parts (b) and (d). It must be shown that there is a
price vector such that α∗ emerges from individually optimal choices and that
the labour market clears. Note that since it is assumed that α0 (ω) 5 N,
it follows that α∗ − α∗
0b = α∗ − Nb.S i n c e Nb + α∗ − wα∗
0b ∈ ∂ e P (w),
by the supporting hyperplane theorem, there exists p ∈ S that supports
Nb+α∗−wα∗
0b ∈ ∂ e P (w) in e P (w).T h a ti s ,pNb+pα∗−wα∗
0 = pb α+pα−wα0
for all b α+α−wα0b ∈ e P (w). Hence, given that α∗ = ω, pNb+pα∗ −wα∗
0 =
pb α + pα − wα0 holds for all b α + α − wα0b ∈ e P (w) such that pα = pω.
Therefore, since e P (w) is a convex cone, the previous argument shows that
(−α∗
0,−α∗,Nb+ α∗) realises the maximal proﬁtr a t ea t(p,w).H o w e v e r ,
since α∗ − Nb = α∗, α∗ also realises the maximal proﬁtr a t ea t(p,w),a n d
pb α
∗ = pNb. Furthermore, since b α
∗ + α∗ − wα∗
0b ∈ e P (w), it follows that
pNb − wα∗
0 = 0, which implies πmax = 0.
2. Let (ων)ν∈N be a distribution of initial endowments such that
P
ν∈N ων =
ω. Consider the price vector (p,w) d e r i v e di ns t e p1 .N o t et h a tα∗ ∈ P (p,w)
and α∗ = ω.L e tπmax ≡
pb α∗−wα∗
0
pα∗ .S u p p o s et h a t(ων)ν∈N satisﬁes the condi-
tion in the second part of the statement, so that pb − πmaxpων = 0,f o ra l l
ν ∈ N. Then, let θν ≡
pων
pα∗ for all ν ∈ N,a n dl e tβν ≡ θνα∗ for all ν ∈ N.
Then, by deﬁnition, pβ
ν = pων and βν ∈ P (p,w) for all ν ∈ N.M o r e o v e r ,
let γν ≡
pb−πmaxpβν
w for all ν ∈ N. Then, by deﬁnition,
pb−πmaxpβν
w = 0 for
all ν ∈ N.S i n c ew = 1 and pb =1 , it follows that 1 = γν
0 = 0,a l lν ∈ N.
Therefore by Lemma 3, (0;βν;γν





























0 , which completes the proof.
Given Theorem A.2, it is possible to state a simpler suﬃcient condition for




+ | ∃α ∈ P & ∃w = 1:α = ω, α − Nb= α, α − Nb≯ α,
α0 = N−1
w & Nb+ α − wα0b ∈ ∂ e P (w)
o
.
Corollary A.1: Let b ∈ Rm
++ , ω ∈ Rm
+ and α0 (ω) 5 N.U n d e rA 1 vA3,
if ω ∈ C∗∗∗ then a reproducible solution (RS) exists for the economy E =
hN;(P,b);(ων)ν∈Ni.
7.2 Appendix 2: Proofs






0 >p bfor some ν.I f αν
0 + γν
0 > 0, then by the convex cone
property of the production set P,a g e n tν can reduce either γν
0 or αν
0 without
violating feasibility, which contradicts optimality. If αν
0 + γν
0 =0 ,t h e nb y
t h ec o n v e xc o n ep r o p e r t yo ft h ep r o d u c t i o ns e tP,a g e n tν can reduce β
ν
without violating feasibility, which contradicts NBC.
Proof of Lemma 2: Suppose, contrary to the statement, that pαν +pβ
ν <
pων. Then, by increasing the investment of capital and hiring other agents,
ν can increase her proﬁts and reduce her labour expended, while reaching
subsistence, which contradicts optimality.
P r o o fo fL e m m a3 :By the convexity of MPν, it follows that (α0ν; β0ν) is




0.T h i si m p l i e st h a tl a b o u re x p e n -









0). By Lemma 1, noting that only processes that yield the




0 = pb. B u tt h e n ,i ti si m m e d i a t et oc h e c kt h a t(α0ν; β0ν; γ0ν
0 )
yields the same amount of net revenue and capital outlay.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 :P a r t( i ) .Suppose, contrary to the statement,
that p =0 , which implies pb =0 . Then, at the solution to MPν, it will be
αν
0 +γν
0 =0 ,a l lν,a n dt h u sα0+γ0 =0 . However, by A1 α0+γ0 =0implies
that α + β = 0, which contradicts part (d) of the Deﬁnition of RS.
Part (ii). Suppose, contrary to the statement, that πmax < 0.B y











0 = pb where
(pb α
ν − wαν







< 0. Hence, at the solution to MPν it
37must be αν = βν = 0,a l lν, which contradicts part (d) of the Deﬁnition of
RS.
Part (iii). Suppose, contrary to the statement, that w 5 0. Then, at
the solution to MPν, it will be γν
0 =0for all ν.F u r t h e r ,πmax 5 0 can be
ruled out, because by part (i), pb > 0.H o w e v e r , i f πmax > 0,t h e na tt h e
solution to MPν it will be βν
0 > 0 for all ν with pων > 0, contradicting part
(c) of the Deﬁnition of RS.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 :By Lemma 1, the net revenue constraint of every
agent holds as an equality. Summing over ν,o n eo b t a i n spb α+pb β−wβ0+wγ0 =
pNb and using part (c) of the Deﬁnition of RS, pb α + pb β = pNb. The result
then follows by part (d) of the Deﬁnition of RS.








pb holds for all ν. Noting that only processes yielding the maximal proﬁtr a t e




0 = pb for all ν. The result then follows by Proposition 1(iii) and Lemma
2.
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m1 :Let c,c ∈ B (p,b) be the reference consumption
bundles of a given deﬁnition satisfying LES.F o rt h i sd e ﬁnition, ν ∈ Nter if
and only if there is a αc ∈ φ(c) such that b α
c = c and αc
0 > αν
0+γν
0, ν ∈ Nted if
and only if there is a αc ∈ φ(c) such that b α













0. N o t et h a tb y
A1, αc
0 > 0 and α
c





Consider agent ν with αν
0 +γν
0 =0at the solution to MPν.S i n c eαc
0 > 0,
such an agent is an exploiter by the above characterisation of Nter.B y
Proposition 3, it follows that Wν =
pb
πmax > 1
πmax [pb − wαc
0].
Next, consider any agent ν with αν
0 + γν
0 > 0 at the solution to MPν.




w and therefore, by LES, ν will be an
exploiter if and only if
pb−πmaxWν
w < αc
0 , which holds if and only if Wν >
1
πmax [pb − wαc
0]. The other two conditions follow in like manner.
Proof of Lemma 4: 1. First, note that by the convexity of MPν, it follows
that if γν
0 < βν
0 for some optimal (αν;βν;γν
0) and γ0ν
0 > β0ν
0 for some other
optimal (α0ν;β0ν;γ0ν
0 ), then there is a solution to MPν such that γ00ν
0 = β00ν
0 .
Therefore, the three cases in the statement are mutually exclusive and they




0 for all optimal (αν;βν;γν
0).I fγν
0 =0 , then clearly
ν ∈ (+,+,0) because by assumption Λν > 0 and 0=γν
0 < βν
0.I fγν
0 > 0,t h e n
construct (α0ν;β0ν;γ0ν
0 ) such that γ0ν







By Lemma 3, (α0ν;β0ν;γ0ν
0 ) is also optimal (it yields the same amount of
net revenue, labour expenditure, and capital outlay). It is suﬃcient to show
that ν / ∈ (+,0,0). Suppose, contrary to the latter statement, that ν has an
optimal solution of the form (αν;0;0). As in Lemma 3, it is possible to show
that ν also has a solution (α0ν;β0ν;γ0ν
0 ) such that α0ν =0 , β0ν = αν and
γ0ν
0 = αν
0. But this contradicts the assumption that all optimal solutions for
ν are such that γν
0 < βν
0.
3. The other two cases are proved similarly.
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m2 :P a r t( i ) .First, ν ∈ C5 if and only if Wν =0 .N e x t ,
by Proposition 3, ν ∈ C1 if and only if Wν =
pb
πmax. The result then follows
from Lemma 4.
Part (ii). It is suﬃcient to prove that the wealth ordering in the state-
ment is true for agents ν, μ ∈ N with 0 <W ν <
pb
πmax and 0 <W μ <
pb
πmax.
By Lemma 4, it follows that ν,μ ∈∪ i=2,3,4Ci. Suppose ν ∈ C4 and μ
∈ C3 but Wν >W μ.( Wν = Wμ is ruled out by the disjointedness of
classes.) Since μ ∈ C3, by reversing the reasoning in Lemma 4, it is pos-









0 . Next, by Lemma 3, consider ν0s solutions
of the form (0;βν;γν
0). Since working time is strictly decreasing in wealth,
Wν >W μ implies Λν = γν
0 < Λμ = γ
0μ










0 which is impossible given that Wν >W μ and thus agent ν
c a nh i r em o r el a b o u rt h a nμ by investing in sectors with the maximal proﬁt
rate πmax > 0. A similar argument proves that if ν ∈ C2 and μ ∈ C3 then
Wν >W μ.
Proof of Proposition 4: 1. By Lemma 4, Proposition 3, and Theorem
2(ii), it is suﬃcient to prove part (iii) of the statement.
2. Suppose pαmin 5 Wν 5 pαmax. By Lemma 3, it is possible to consider
ν0s solutions of the form (0;βν;γν
0), without loss of generality. By optimality,




0 = pb,o re q u i v a l e n t l yπmaxpβ
ν +
wΛν = pb,w i t hpβ = Wν. But then, since pαmin 5 Wν 5 pαmax,b yt h e
convexity of P, it follows that there exists some α ∈ P, such that πmaxpα +
39wα0 = pb,w i t hpα = Wν. The latter equation implies that α0 = Λν,a n d
thus Γν has a solution of the form (+,0,0).
3. Conversely, suppose that ν ∈ C3,s ot h a tΓν has a solution of the form
(+,0,0). This implies that there exists α ∈ P such that πmaxpα+wα0 = pb,
with pα = Wν, which implies pαmin 5 Wν 5 pαmax.
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m3 :The result follows immediately from Theorem 1 and
Proposition 4.
Proof of Corollary 2: 1. First, consider Deﬁnition 7. By Theorem 3, what
















. Then, πmaxW +
w(α0+β0)
N = pb.B yd e ﬁnition,
W =
p(α+β)
N holds, since by Lemma 1, p
³
b α + b β
´
= Npb holds, and at












α0m i n =
pb
α0m i n−w,a n d
πmaxpαmax





α0m i n − w 5
pb
(α0+β0)/N − w 5
pb
α0m a x − w.T h u s , α0max 5
(α0+β0)
N 5 α0minholds. Given that πmaxpαmin+wα0min= πmaxW +
w(α0+β0)
N =
πmaxpαmax + wα0max = pb, the last inequality implies that pαmin 5 W 5
pαmax.
2. Consider next Deﬁnitions 5 and 6. As noted above, minc∈B(p,b) l.v.(c;p,w) 5
l.v.(b;p,w) 5 t(α0 + β0)=
α0+γ0





N . Hence, by Theorem 3 and step 1 of the proof, it follows
























Let c∗ ≡ argminc∈B(p,b) l.v.(c;p,w). By the deﬁnition of l.v.(c∗;p,w),
there exists α(c∗) ∈ P (p,w) such that α0 (c∗)=l.v.(c∗;p,w). In this case,
pc∗ = pb α(c∗) holds. Let us show this. Suppose pc∗ <p b α(c∗) if c∗ ≤ b α(c∗).
Since pb α(c∗)=πmaxpα(c∗)+wα0 (c∗), it follows that pc∗ < πmaxpα(c∗)+
wα0 (c∗). In this case, for some 0 <t<1,i ti st r u et h a tptb α(c∗)=
pc∗ and tα0 (c∗)=l.v.(tb α(c∗);p,w) < α0 (c∗)=l.v.(c∗;p,w). T h i si sa
contradiction, since tb α(c∗) ∈ B (p,b) and α0 (c∗)=m i n c∈B(p,b) l.v.(c;p,w).
Thus, pc∗ = pb α(c∗). The last equation implies that α(c∗) ∈ Γ(p,w) and
b α(c∗) ∈ b Γ(p,w). Note that , since c∗ 5 b α(c∗) by deﬁnition, α(c∗) ∈ P
40implies (−α0 (c∗),−α(c∗),c ∗ + α(c∗)) ∈ P by A3. Since pc∗ = pb α(c∗),
b α(c∗) ∈ b Γ(p,w) implies that (−α0 (c∗),−α(c∗),c ∗ + α(c∗)) ∈ Γ(p,w) and








5 pαmax holds from pc∗ = pb,w h i c h
completes the proof.


















Given this data, the production possibility set P(A,B,L) can be deﬁned:
P(A,B,L) ≡
©




+ | ∃x ∈ R
3
+ : α 5 (−Lx,−Ax,Bx)
ª
.
Then, consider a convex cone subsistence economy deﬁned by P(A,B,L), b =
(2,2),a n dω =( N,N).L e t (ων)ν∈N be such that ων =( δν,δν),w h e r e
δν 5 2,a l lν ∈ N,a n dωi =( 2 ,2),s o m ei ∈ N.
Let ej ∈ R3
+ and αj, j =1 ,2,3,b ed e ﬁn e da si nE x a m p l e1a b o v e .
Then, b α
1 ≡ (0,8), b α
2 ≡ (4,8),a n db α









. In this economy, p =( 1 ,0) and w =2constitute a RS
with αν =0 , βν = δνα2
2 ,a n dγν
0 =1− δν
2 for all ν ∈ N. The corresponding
aggregate production is α + β = Nα2
2 . In such a case, π(α + β;p,w) ≡
pb α2−wα2
0
pα2 =1 ,w h e r e a sπ(α1;p,w) ≡
pb α1−wα1
0










.T h u s , P (p,w)={α ∈ P | ∃λ > 0:α = λα2} and βν ∈
P (p,w) for all ν ∈ N.
Hence, pαmin = pαmax = p
α2







πmax [pb − w(l.v.(b))] = 2 − 17
18 = 19
18 > 1. Therefore, every agent
ν ∈ C1 ∪ C2 with 1 <W ν < 19
18 is exploited, and the CECP does not hold
in this economy if Deﬁnition 4 is adopted.
Proof of Theorem 4: From Theorem 3, there only remains to prove that
(3)⇒(1). Suppose that πmax =0 . Then, every producer earns the income pb
solely from the wage. Thus, to earn the same income, every producer sup-
plies the same amount of labour which is equal to the labour input
α0+β0
N
corresponding to the social production activity per capita. Note that if
πmax =0 ,t h e nc,c ∈ b Γ(p,w) implies wαc
0 = wα
c
0 = pb = w
α0+β0






0, which implies that there is no exploiter nor exploited agent
by LES.
P r o o fo fL e m m a5 :Suppose that (αν; βν; γν
0)ν∈N is not eﬃcient. This im-
plies that there exists another allocation (α0ν; β0ν; γ0ν




























































































0 .B y d e ﬁ-
nition, β00
0 = γ00
0. Thus, since pβ
00 5
P













































00,s i n c e(αν; βν; γν
0)ν∈N is a RS and
























for all feasible (α00ν; β00ν; γ00ν
0 )ν∈N that satisfy Deﬁnition 10(i). Therefore
α0+β0 5 α0
0+γ0
0. A similar argument holds for
¡
(p0,w 0),(α0ν; β0ν; γ0ν
0 )ν∈N
¢
proving α0 + β0 = α0
0 + γ0
0, which establishes the desired result.
P r o o fo fL e m m a6 :By the construction of (α0ν)ν∈N,
¡
(p,w),(α0ν;0 ;0 ) ν∈N
¢
satisﬁes Deﬁnition 1(b), (c), and (d). Therefore, only individual optimality








ν∈N pων, it follows that P
ν∈N pα0ν =
P






ν + b β
ν´
= Npb,a n dt h e r e f o r e
P
ν∈N pb α
0ν = Npb,s o
that pb α
0ν = pb holds for all ν ∈ N. Further, note that, by Lemma 5, the allo-
cation (αν; βν; γν





minimal amount of labour expenditure to produce Nbas a social net output
under the capital constraint
P
ν∈N ων.T h i si m p l i e st h a tα0ν
0 is the minimal
labour expenditure to produce b under the constraint ω0ν for each ν ∈ N.
Hence, α0ν
0 is the solution of the problem MPν given the price vector (p,w)




ν∈N (αν + βν)
by deﬁnition, (p,w) supports
P
ν∈N α0ν as a proﬁt-rate maximizing pro-
duction point. Therefore,
¡
(p,w),(α0ν;0 ;0 ) ν∈N
¢
is a RS for the economy
hN;(P,b);(ω0ν)ν∈Ni.
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m5 :
(⇐): It is easy to see that Deﬁnition 7 meets RE and IES.T h u s ,i t





be an eﬃcient RS for the economy hN;(P,b);(ων)ν∈Ni. Then, by Deﬁnition





all ν ∈ N ,a n dα0 + β























<p ω holds. Choose














is still an eﬃcient RS for the economy
hN;(P,b);(ω0ν)ν∈Ni. Then, by Lemma 6, the non-exploitative allocation is






i with (α0ν)ν∈N ∈ PN






N for each ν ∈ N. Thus, in any case,
Deﬁnition 7 meets FNE.
(⇒): Consider any deﬁnition of labour exploitation satisfying LES, FNE,
RE,a n dIES.




such that πmax > 0 and α + β =
P
ν∈N ων = ω.
By Lemma 5, (αν; βν; γν





N does not hold.




N . Let us consider another economy hN;(P,b);(ω0ν)ν∈Ni
with ω0ν = ω
N for any ν ∈ N. Then, let us consider an allocation (α0ν; β0ν; γ0ν
0 )ν∈N ∈
(P × P × [0,1])
N such that α0ν =
α+β
N , β0ν = 0,a n dγ0ν






constitutes a RS with
43πmax > 0 and α0 + β0 = α + β. Then, by IES, its corresponding reference
bundles c0,c 0 ∈ Rm
+ meet c0 = c and c0 = c. Thus, since
α0+β0
N is the labour ex-














N . Let us consider the same economy and the






















N ,t h e nw ec a nu s e








N , then we can construct an alternative











0 and for any other ν ∈ N\{ν0}, α0ν
0 + γ0ν
0 = αc
0. Then, the desired








N , then there exists a non-exploitative alloca-
tion (α0ν; β0ν; γ0ν
0 )ν∈N such that α0 + β0 = α + β, α0
0 + γ0





N for some ν0 ∈ N. Then, consider (α00ν; β00ν; γ00ν
0 )ν∈N
such that for any ν ∈ N\{ν0}, (α00ν; β00ν; γ00ν
0 )=( α0ν; β0ν; γ0ν



























































0 ,i f(α0ν; β0ν; γ0ν
0 )ν∈N is a
non-exploitative allocation at (p,w),t h e ns oi s(α00ν; β00ν; γ00ν
0 )ν∈N by Deﬁn-











FNE c a nb ea p p l i e dt o(α00ν; β00ν; γ00ν
0 )ν∈N,s ot h a tt h e r ee x i s t(p0,w 0) and
(ω0ν)ν∈N with
P
ν∈N ω0ν = ω such that
¡









0 > α0 + β0 and (αν; βν; γν
0)ν∈N is eﬃcient, Proposition 6 im-
plies that (α00ν; β00ν; γ00ν








0) (that is, π00max > 0), since any RS with πmax =0
is eﬃcient. Moreover, by Lemmas 2 and 5, there must be some agent ν such
that α00ν
0 + γ00ν
0 =0 . But then, by assumption A1 on P,t h i si m p l i e st h a t
(α00ν; β00ν; γ00ν
0 )ν∈N would only be non-exploitative if c = 0,w h i c hc o n t r a -
dicts the assumption that c ∈ B(p,b),b e c a u s epb > 0 by Proposition 1.





0. Then we can construct an alternative














0 . Then, the desired














c a no b t a i nac o n t r a d i c t i o nb yIES and RE.





with πmax > 0,s u c ht h a tα + β ≤
P





holds, then the same argument as for α + β = ω can be applied, because
(αν; βν; γν




<p ω holds, then by Lemma 2,
there is a subset N− ⊂ N such that for each ν ∈ N−, pb β
ν
− wβν
0 = pb <
πmaxpων − wβν
0 holds. Thus, by selecting ω0ν ≤ ων appropriately from each















tutes an eﬃcient RS for this economy hN;(P,b);(ω0ν)ν∈Ni. By applying the
same argument as in the case of α+β = ω, one can check that any formulation




in hN;(P,b);(ω0ν)ν∈Ni. Then, by IES,t h es a m e















w holds for each




N holds for each ν ∈ N and this RS
is eﬃcient, according to Deﬁnition 10.
Let c,c ∈ B (p,b) be the corresponding reference bundles. Since πmax =
0,t h e npc − wαc
0 5 pb − w
α0+β0
N =0and pc − wα
c
0 5 pb − w
α0+β0
N =









that either (i) every agent is neither exploiter nor exploited, or (ii) every





N . Then, by assumption A3, there exists a non-exploitative allocation
(α0ν; β0ν; γ0ν










0ν = ω, and the same argument can be applied as in step
3 above to prove that (α0ν; β0ν; γ0ν
0 )ν∈N would only be non-exploitative if











N . Then, by assumption A3, there exists another
non-exploitative allocation (α0ν; β0ν; γ0ν











0ν = ω, and the same argument
c a nb ea p p l i e da si ns t e p3a b o v et op r o v et h a t(α0ν; β0ν; γ0ν
0 )ν∈N would
only be non-exploitative if c = 0, which contradicts the assumption that
c ∈ B(p,b).
In sum, if a deﬁnition of labour exploitation satisﬁes LES, RE, FNE,






P r o o fo fT h e o r e m6 :
(⇐): It is easy to see that Deﬁnition 7 meets EEUL and IES.T h e r e f o r e ,





be an eﬃcient RS for the economy hN;(P,b);(ων)ν∈Ni. Then, by Deﬁnition










= pω holds. Then, by Lemma 6, the non-
































is still an eﬃcient RS for the economy hN;(P,b);(ω0ν)ν∈Ni and by Lemma 6,













N for each ν ∈ N.
Thus, in either case, Deﬁnition 7 meets FNE∗.
(⇒): Consider any deﬁnition of labour exploitation satisfying LES, FNE∗,
EEUL,a n dIES.




such that πmax > 0 and α + β =
P
ν∈N ων = ω.
By Lemma 5, (αν; βν; γν













N .L e t(α0ν; β0ν; γ0ν
0 )ν∈N be a non-exploitative allo-
cation at (p,w). Then, by FNE∗, this allocation is feasible non-exploitative










0 > α0 + β0,t h u si m p l y i n gt h a t
(α0ν; β0ν; γ0ν
0 )ν∈N is ineﬃcient for hN;(P,b);(ω0ν)ν∈Ni.
Let us show the last statement. If α0
0 + γ0
0 > α0 + β0, then another
allocation (α00ν; β00ν; γ00ν
0 )ν∈N can be constructed such that
P





















0 holds for all ν ∈ N,a n ds t r i c t l y













0. This construction implies that (α0ν; β0ν; γ0ν
0 )ν∈N
is ineﬃcient.
The last statement implies that p0
³
b α





π0max > 0), since any RS with πmax =0is eﬃcient. Moreover, by Lem-
mas 2 and 5, there must be some agent ν such that α0ν
0 +γ0ν
0 =0 . But then,
by assumption A1 on P,t h i si m p l i e st h a t(α0ν; β0ν; γ0ν
0 )ν∈N would only be
non-exploitative if c = 0 which contradicts the assumption that c ∈ B(p,b),





N .L e t(α0ν; β0ν; γ0ν
0 )ν∈N be a non-exploitative allo-
cation at (p,w). Then, by FNE∗, this allocation is feasible non-exploitative










0 < α0+β0, thus implying that the
original allocation (αν; βν; γν






0.L e t(α0ν; β0ν; γ0ν
0 )ν∈N be a non-exploitative
allocation at (p,w):b yFNE∗, (α0ν; β0ν; γ0ν
0 )ν∈N is feasible with respect to
















0 > α0 + β0.S i n c e α + β = ω by construction, the
RS allocation (αν; βν; γν







0 > α0 + β0,t h e n(α0ν; β0ν; γ0ν
0 )ν∈N is ineﬃcient,
as shown in the case of αc
0 >
α0+β0





0 )ν∈N would only be non-exploitative if c = 0,w h i c hc o n t r a d i c t s






0 = α0+β0,t h e nc o n -
sider (α00ν; β00ν; γ00ν
0 )ν∈N such that for any ν ∈ N\{ν0}, (α00ν; β00ν; γ00ν
0 )=
(α0ν; β0ν; γ0ν




























































if (α0ν; β0ν; γ0ν
0 )ν∈N is a non-exploitative allocation at (p,w),t h e ns oi s
(α00ν; β00ν; γ00ν













0,a n dl e t(α0ν; β0ν; γ0ν
0 )ν∈N be a non-














0 > α0 +β0,w ea p p l y






let (α0ν; β0ν; γ0ν
0 )ν∈N be a non-exploitative allocation at (p,w).B yEEUL,i t
follows that α0+β0 >l . v .(Nb).B u tt h e n(α0ν; β0ν; γ0ν















N should hold, which
is a contradiction.





with πmax > 0,s u c ht h a tα + β ≤
P





holds, then the same argument as the case of α + β = ω can be applied,
since (αν; βν; γν




<p ω holds, then by Lemma




pb < πmaxpων − wβν
0 holds. Thus, by selecting ω0ν ≤ ων appropriately from














constitutes an eﬃcient RS for this economy hN;(P,b);(ω0ν)ν∈Ni.B y a p -

































w holds for each




N holds for each ν ∈ N,a n dt h i sR S
is eﬃcient, according to Deﬁnition 10.
Let c,c ∈ B (p,b) be the corresponding reference bundles. Since πmax =0 ,
then pc − wαc
0 5 pb − w
α0+β0
N =0and pc − wα
c








N by c,c ∈ B (p,b).B y LES, α
c
0 = αc
0 holds, so that
either (i) every agent is neither an exploiter nor exploited, or (ii) every agent





N . Then, by assumption A3, there exists a non-exploitative allocation
(α0ν; β0ν; γ0ν






0 > α0+β0,w h i c h
implies that (α0ν; β0ν; γ0ν
0 )ν∈N is ineﬃcient, as shown in the case of πmax > 0.
Thus, as shown in step 1 of the proof above, (α0ν; β0ν; γ0ν
0 )ν∈N would only be












N . Then, by assumption A3, there exists another
non-exploitative allocation (α0ν; β0ν; γ0ν












N .T h u s ,(α0ν; β0ν; γ0ν
0 )ν∈N would only be non-exploitative
if c = 0, which contradicts the assumption that c ∈ B(p,b).
In sum, if a deﬁnition of labour exploitation satisﬁes LES, EEUL, FNE∗,






7.3 Appendix 3: Additional Claims
In this Appendix, some additional claims made in the paper are rigorously
proved. First, Example A.1 proves that, if the deﬁnition of exploitation
satisﬁes LES,t h eCECP may hold if a deﬁnition of labour value is adopted
w h i c hd o e sn o tf o c u so np r o ﬁt-maximising processes.









12 12 6 0
¸
, L =( 1 ,1,1,1),
w h e r et h en o t a t i o ni st h es a m ea si nE x a m p l e1a b o v ea n dt h ep r od u c t i o np o s -
sibility set is P(A,B,L) ≡
©
α ∈ R− × R2
− × R2
+ | ∃x ∈ R4
+ : α 5 (−Lx,−Ax,Bx)
ª
.
Then, consider a convex cone subsistence economy deﬁned by P(A,B,L), b =
(2,2),a n dω =( N,N).L e t (ων)ν∈N be such that ων =( δν,δν),w h e r e
δν 5 2,a l lν ∈ N,a n dωi =( 2 ,2),s o m ei ∈ N.
Let ej and αj, j =1 ,2,3,4,b ed e ﬁned as in Example 1 discussed in
Section 3 above. Then b α
1 ≡ (0,8), b α
2 ≡ (4,8), b α
3 ≡ (4,4),a n db α
4 ≡








. In this economy, p =( 1 ,0),
w =2constitute a RS, with αν =0 ,βν = δνα3
2 , and γν
0 =1 − δν
2 , all
ν ∈ N. The corresponding aggregate production is α + β = Nα3
2 .A t t h i s
RS, π (α + β;p,w) ≡
pb α3−wα3
0











pα4 =1 .T h u s , P (p,w)=
{α ∈ P | ∃λ > 0:λα ∈ co{α3,α4}}.
Choose c = c = b α2




πmaxpαmin = πmaxpαmax = πmaxp
α3
2 , Theorem 3 states that the CECP holds








2, it follows that αc = αc = α2
2 / ∈ P (p,w).
49Example A.2 instead proves the existence of ineﬃcient RS’s, and it high-
lights their structure and the role of big capitalists in generating ineﬃciencies.











, L =( 1 ,0.8),
w h e r et h en o t a t i o ni st h es a m ea si nE x a m p l e1a b o v ea n dt h ep r od u c t i o np o s -
sibility set is P(A,B,L) ≡
©
α ∈ R− × R2
− × R2
+ | ∃x ∈ R2
+ : α 5 (−Lx,−Ax,Bx)
ª
.
Consider a subsistence economy E = hN;(P,b);(ων)ν∈Ni deﬁned by N =
{1,2}, P = P(A,B,L), b =( 1 ,1),a n d(ω1,ω2)=( ( 2 ,1),(0,0)).
To begin with, it is shown that the price vector (p,w) = ((1,0),1),a n d
the allocation (α1; β1; γ1
0)=( 0 ;( −1,−(1,1),(3,3));0),a n d(α2; β2; γ2
0)=
(0;0;1)constitute a RS for this economy. First, given this (p,w),t h ea c t i v i t y
β1 =( −1,−(1,1),(3,3)) ∈ P(A,B,L) is a maximal proﬁt-rate production





pβ1 =1 .L e tβ0 ≡ (−0.8,−(2,1),(4,4)) ∈





pβ0 =0 .6.T h u s ,π1 (p,w) > π0 (p,w).B yt h e
property of P(A,B,L), any other production point α ∈ P(A,B,L) is represented
as α 5 tβ1 + t0β0 for some suitable non-negative values t,t0 = 0.T h u s ,
π1 (p,w) > π0 (p,w) implies that β1 is a maximal proﬁt-rate point. Second,
since pb =1and w =1 ,a g e n t2’s optimal solution is γ2
0 =1 ,s i n c eω2 =( 0 ,0).




π1 (p,w)=πmax,a n dpβ
1 <p ω1.N o t et h a tb β
1
=2 b and β1
0 = γ2
0 =1 .S i n c e
β
1 ≤ ω1, which implies β






with pβ <p ω.
The allocation (αν; βν; γν
0)ν∈N is ineﬃcient. Consider β0 as the alter-
native social production point. Note that β
0 = ω, b β
0
=( 2 ,3) ≥ 2b,a n d
β0
0 =0 .8 < β1
0. Construct an alternative allocation (α0ν; β0ν; γ0ν
0 )ν∈N as
(α01; β01; γ01
0 )=( 0 ; β0;0) and (α02; β02; γ02
0 ) = (0;0;0.8).S i n c e γ02
0 < γ2
0,
this implies that the RS allocation (αν; βν; γν
0)ν∈N is not eﬃcient.
As noted in Section 5 above, the source of the ineﬃciency is the violation
of the assumption of local nonsatiation: an increase in wealth does not make
agent 1 better oﬀ. Thus, it is individually rational for agent 1 to use the
labour intensive activity β1 because it yields the maximum rate of proﬁt
at (p,w) = ((1,0),1), instead of the capital-intensive, and socially optimal
technique β0 which yields a lower proﬁtr a t e .
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